The Role of Expectations in Economic Fluctuations and the Efficacy of Monetary Policy by Motolese, Maurizio (ORCID:0000-0002-3713-1640) et al.
  
The Role of Expectations in Economic Fluctuations and the 
Efficacy of Monetary Policy
by
Mordecai Kurz,  Hehui Jin and Maurizio Motolese
Stanford University and Catholic University of Milan. 
 November 12, 2003
Abstract
We show diverse beliefs is an important propagation mechanism of fluctuations, money non neutrality and efficacy
of monetary policy.  Since expectations affect demand, our theory shows economic fluctuations are mostly driven
by varying demand not supply shocks. Using a competitive model with flexible prices in which agents hold
Rational Belief (see Kurz (1994)) we show that (i) our economy replicates well the empirical record of fluctuations
in the U.S. (ii) Under monetary rules without discretion, monetary policy has a strong stabilization effect and an
aggressive anti-inflationary policy can reduce inflation volatility to zero.  (iii) The statistical Phillips Curve
changes substantially with policy instruments and activist policy rules render it vertical.  (iv) Although prices are
flexible, money shocks result in less than proportional changes in inflation hence the aggregate price level appears
“sticky” with respect to money shocks. (v) Discretion in monetary policy adds a random element to policy and
increases volatility.  The impact of discretion on the efficacy of policy depends upon the structure of market beliefs
about future discretionary decisions.  We study two rationalizable beliefs.  In one case, market beliefs weaken the
effect of policy and in the second, beliefs bolster policy outcomes and discretion could be a desirable attribute of the
policy rule.  Since the central bank does not know any more than the private sector, real social gain from discretion
arise only in extraordinary cases.  Hence, the weight of the argument leads us to conclude that bank’s policy should
be transparent and abandon discretion except for rare and unusual circumstances.  (vi) An implication of our
model suggests the current effective policy is only mildly activist and aims mostly to target inflation.
JEL classification:  E31; E32; E52; E58; D58.
Keywords: Monetary policy rules; Money non neutrality; Business cycles; Market volatility; Propagation
mechanism; Capacity utilization; Heterogenous beliefs; Over confidence; Rational Belief; Optimism;
Pessimism; Non stationarity; Empirical distribution; 
For Correspondence:
Mordecai Kurz, Joan Kenney Professor of Economics
Department of Economics, Landau Building
Stanford University
Stanford, CA. 94305 - 6072
Email: mordecai@stanford.edu
1This research was supported by a grant of the Smith Richardson Foundation to the Stanford Institute for
Economic Policy Research (SIEPR).  We thank Kenneth Judd for constant advice which was crucial at several
points in the development of this work.  We also thank Ho-Mou Wu for constructive suggestions.
2 Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA. 94305-6072.
3 Department of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA. 94305-6072.
4 Istituto di Politica Economica, Universitá Cattolica di Milano, Via Necchi 5, 20123, Milano, Italy
1
The Role of Expectations in Economic Fluctuations and the 
Efficacy of Monetary Policy1
by
Mordecai Kurz2,  Hehui Jin3 and Maurizio Motolese4
November 12, 2003
1. Introduction 
What explains the observed real effect of money on the economy and is money not neutral?  This
is perhaps the most debated question of our time.  Empirical evidence has demonstrated that monetary
policy, unanticipated and anticipated (e.g. Mishkin (1982)), has real effects and virtually all countries
established economic stabilization as the main goal of central bank policy.  However, if we seek a
scientific justification for this policy, we find sharp differences in models, assumptions and methods used
to arrive at this conclusion. 
On one side is the standard rational expectations (in short, RE)  based real business cycle theory
which holds that all real fluctuations are caused by exogenous real technological shocks, money is
neutral and only relative prices matter for economic allocation.  Under this theory, anticipated monetary
policy cannot have real effect and hence stabilizing monetary policy cannot provide any long term and
consistent social benefits (e.g. see Lucas (1972), Sargent and Wallace (1978)).  
An opposing view holds that money is not neutral, that economic fluctuations impose a policy
tradeoff between inflation and unemployment and such a “Phillips curve” is at the foundation of
economic stabilization policy.  In recent years this Keynesian perspective has been developed by the
Dynamic New Keynesian (in short DNK) Theory which erected the Keynesian view on three pillars: (1)
the market consists of price setting monopolistically competitive firms,  (2) prices are “sticky” due to
restrictions on firms’ ability to adjust prices  (e.g. Taylor (1980) (1993) (1999), Calvo (1983), Yun
2(1996), Goodfriend and King (1997), Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999),  Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (1999),  Levin Wieland and Williams (1999), Mankiw and Reis (2002), McCallum and Nelson
(1999), Rotemberg and Woodford (1999), Woodford (2001a), (2001b), (2002)), and (3) markets are
complete, agents are identical and hold RE within a Rational Expectations Equilibrium (in short, REE). 
Most work with Calvo’s (1983) idealization where at any date only a fraction of firms are “allowed” to
change prices while others cannot.  In such an economy output fluctuations are caused by exogenous
shocks and amplified by incorrect firms’ price setting.  This monopolistic competitive equilibrium is not
Pareto efficient.  Changes in nominal rates have real effects because they impact expected future prices
by firms.  An exogenous shock causes some firms to change prices but others cannot adjust them and
must produce output given prices set earlier, based on expectations held at that date and are thus the
“wrong” prices today.  Monetary policy aims to restore efficiency by countering the negative effect of
price rigidity. Depending upon the model of price stickiness, this objective implies that central bank
aims to set nominal rates at each date so the resulting equilibrium private sector expected inflation
equals the rate anticipated by agents forced to fix prices in the previous date.
We share the DNK theory’s view that monetary policy is a very useful stabilization tool. 
However, this paper shows an important cause for the efficacy of monetary policy is the heterogeneity
of market expectations rather than price inflexibility and monopolistic competition in price setting.  An
argument in support of the efficacy of monetary policy would consist of three parts:
(A)  In a market economy agents make socially undesirable allocation decisions resulting in excess
fluctuations of inflation and real variables hence a component of business cycle fluctuations is man
made, endogenously propagated by the actions of agents.
(B) Money is not neutral: changes in the nominal rate impact aggregate excess demand.
(C) Monetary policy can help stabilize the endogenous component of fluctuations.
In what economies do conclusions (A)-(C) hold?   Under the standard assumptions of  (i)
frictionless perfect competition, (ii) flexible prices and (iii) REE allocations, conclusions (A)-(C) cannot
be reached: money is neutral and monetary policy has no social function.  To deduce (A)-(C), some of
these assumptions must be modified.   The DNK theory is based on rejecting the first two, postulating
instead a monopolistic price setting and price inflexibility.  We preserve the assumptions of perfect
competition and price flexibility hence our model economy is entirely standard.  However, we remove
3the homogeneous belief assumption and deduce our results from the assumption that agents hold
heterogenous beliefs about state variables.  In fact, even if a monetary policy rule is transparent and
there are no differences of opinion about what the rule is, agents still make different forecasts since they
make different forecasts of the state variables.  Our equilibrium is a Radner Equilibrium (Radner
(1972)) but we restrict beliefs by requiring them to satisfy the rationality principle of Rational Belief (in
short RB or RBE for “Rational Belief Equilibrium”) developed by Kurz (1994) and others in Kurz
(1996), (1997).  We explain later the restrictions on beliefs imposed by the RB principle.  Since belief
heterogeneity is the driving force of our theory, we provide a short review of the RB perspective.
1.1 The Rational Belief Principle
“Rational Belief” is not a theory which demonstrates rational agents should adopt any specific
belief.   In fact, since the RB theory explains the observed heterogeneity of beliefs, it would be a
contradiction to propose that any particular belief is the “correct” belief which rational agents must
adopt.  The RB theory starts by observing that the true stochastic law of motion of the economy is a 
non-stationary process with structural breaks and complex dynamics and the probability law of this
process is not known by anyone.  Agents have a long history of data generated by the process in the
past which they use to compute relative frequencies of finite dimensional events and correlation among
observed variables.  With this knowledge they compute the empirical distribution of observed variables
and use it to construct an empirical probability measure over sequences.  Since all these measures are
based on the law of large numbers, it is a theorem that this estimated probability model must be
stationary.  In the RB theory it is called the “empirical measure” or the “stationary measure.”
In contrast with REE where the true law of motion is common knowledge, agents in an RBE
form beliefs based only on the available data.  Hence,  any principle on the basis of which agents can be
judged as rational must be based on the data rather than on the true but unknown law of motion.  Since
a “belief” is a model of the economy together with a probability measure over sequences of variables,
such a model can be simulated to generate artificial data.  With simulated data the agent can compute
the empirical distribution of observed variables and hence the empirical probability measure the model
implies. Based on these facts, the RB theory proposes a simple Principle of Rationality.  It says that if
the agent’s model generates an empirical distribution which is not the same as the one known for the
5  We  note examples of prior work which used the RBE perspective.  Earlier papers have argued that
most volatility in financial markets is caused by the beliefs of agents (e.g. Kurz (1996), (1997a),  Kurz and
Schneider (1996), Kurz and Beltratti (1997), Kurz and Motolese (2001) and Nielsen (1996)).  These papers
introduced a unified model which explains, simultaneously, a list of financial phenomena regarded as “anomalies”
centered around the Equity Premium Puzzle.  The model’s key feature is the heterogeneity of agent’s beliefs where
the distribution of market beliefs (i.e. market “state of belief”) fluctuates over time.  Phenomena such as the Equity
Premium Puzzle are then explained by the fact that pessimistic “bears” who aim to avoid capital losses drive
interest rates low and the equity premium high (for a unified treatment see Kurz and Motolese (2001)).  The RBE
theory was used by Kurz (1997b) and Nielsen (2003) to explain the volatility of foreign exchange markets and by
Wu and Guo (2003) to study speculation and trading volume in asset markets. 
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economy at large, then the agent’s model (i.e. “belief”) should be declared irrational.   The converse is
also required to hold: for a belief to be rational its simulated data must reproduce the known empirical
distribution of the observed variables.  The RB rationality principle means a belief is viewed as rational
if it is a subjective model which cannot be disproved with the empirical evidence.  Since diverse theories
are compatible with the same evidence, this rationality principle permits diversity of beliefs among
equally informed rational agents.  Agents who hold rational beliefs may make “incorrect” forecasts at
any date  t  but must be correct, on average.  Also, date t forecasts may deviate from the forecast
implied by the long run empirical distribution.  However, since the RB rationality principle requires the
long term average of an agent’s forecasts to agree with the forecast based on the empirical frequencies,
it follows as a theorem that agents who hold rational beliefs must have forecast functions which vary
over time.  The key tool we use to describe the distribution of beliefs in an economy is the “market state
of belief.”   This is a state variable which uniquely identifies the vector of  conditional probability
functions held by all agents in the economy at each date t5.
The RB rationality principle is compatible with several known theories.  An REE is a special
case of an RBE and so are the associated REE with sunspots or with bubbles.  Also, several models of
Bayesian Learning and Behavioral Economics are special cases of an RBE and satisfy the RB rationality
principle for some parameter choices.  
A short explanation of how an RBE leads to implications (A)-(C) above may be helpful.  In a
typical RBE endogenous variables depend upon the state of belief which exhibit fluctuations over
time.  Such fluctuations induce fluctuations of economic variables making them more volatile than
explained by exogenous shocks.  Excess volatility, called “Endogenous Uncertainty,” is amplified by
correlation among individual beliefs.   Belief heterogeneity takes two forms: (i) diverse interpretation
5of information, and (ii) diverse forecasts of future prices due to diverse individual forecasts of future
state of belief of others.  When states of belief are “optimistic,” agents increase the level of economic
activity above normal and when they are “pessimistic” they cut back on consumption, investment and
production plans below normal levels.  Fluctuations in market states of belief act as an externality,
causing private sector plans to be excessively volatile and socially undesirable. 
Implication (B) showing that money is not neutral in an RBE is not new.  It has been reported
in Motolese (2001), (2003) and in Kurz, Jin and Motolese (2003) who study monetary policy with the
model of random growth of money.  The present paper builds on Kurz, Jin and Motolese (2003)
whose aim was only to demonstrate that diversity of beliefs can reproduce all the empirical
regularities observed in monetary economies, under competitive conditions and with fully flexible
prices.  To see why money is not neutral in an RBE one can simply refer to Lucas (1972).  In this
seminal contribution Lucas showed the problem of money neutrality is fundamentally an expectational
problem and the Quantity Theory of money is an inappropriate tool to study it.  To exhibit money
neutrality Lucas (1972) used an equilibrium context and showed one must assume agents hold the
same beliefs, all expecting money to be neutral.   If common belief in money neutrality does not hold
money is not neutral.  But once we deviate from REE, agents hold different beliefs about all future
events including the effect of monetary shocks even if they have the same information.  Money non
neutrality is the natural outcome.  
As for implication (C), central bank policy cannot affect fluctuations due to technology.  Since
money is not neutral, the excess endogenous volatility of a market economy suggests the bank can
stabilize the endogenous component of fluctuations by countering the effect of private beliefs.   
Rigidities and imperfections such as inflexible wages, costly input adjustments, asymmetric
information or insufficient hedging opportunities certainly play some role in the efficacy of monetary
policy.  Such factors complement our theory.  The diversity of market beliefs is a demand driven
mechanism which generates economic volatility, real and financial.  It provides a unifying paradigm
to explain the propagation of business fluctuations, to clarify why monetary policy is effective and to
justify the use of such policy as a stabilization tool.  Adding any of these rigidities to our theory only
strengthen our conclusions.  However, we do not explore such complementarity in this paper.
In this paper we explore the way a central bank can attain stabilization by countering the
effect of private expectations.  We examine alternative monetary policies in order to study their
6impact on economic volatility.  Numerical simulations are used to clarify the qualitative implications
of our theory but we do not aim at accurate calibration.  Only order of magnitude of the phenomena
of interest are explored.  The structure of this paper is as follows.  In Sections 2-3 we develop our
formal model, explain the structure of beliefs and the restrictions which the RB principle imposes on
them.  In Section 4 we study the volatility of the RBE with money shocks.  We compare its volatility
with the level of fluctuations of the traditional Real Business Cycles (RBC in short) model and with a
hypothetical economy in which money grows at a constant rate.  In Section 5 we introduce the
monetary rules and study in detail the performance of the economy under simple Taylor (1993) type
rules with and without discretion.  Section 6 concludes.
2. The Economic Environment
The economy has four traded goods: a consumption good, one period nominal bill, labor
services and fiat money.  Agents trade all goods on competitive markets.  There are two types of
agents and a large number of identical agents within each type.  Each agent is a member of one of two
types of infinitely lived dynasties identified by their labor, by their utility (which is defined over
consumption, labor services and real money holding) and by their beliefs.  A member of a dynasty
lives a fixed short life and during his life makes decisions based on his own state of belief without
knowing the states of belief of his predecessors.  An agent also manages a constant returns to scale
firm owned by the dynasty.  The firm employs the capital stock the dynasty owns and produces
consumer goods while operating in competitive markets for labor services and for short term loans. 
Since each firm is owned by a dynasty, the intertemporal decisions of the firm are made based on the
stochastic discount factors of its owner.  The income of agents consists of labor income and the
income from four assets owned.  First, capital owned by the agent and employed by the dynasty’s
firm.  Second are ownership share in the dynasty’s firm.  These ownership shares do not trade on the
open market.  Third is a one period, zero net supply nominal bill which pays a riskless return hence it
is risky with respect to the rate of inflation.  Fourth is fiat money issued by a central bank.  
Under a monetary environment of random money growth each agent receives a proportional
share of the money growth but the mean growth rate of money equals the mean growth rate of GNP
hence the long term average rate of inflation is zero.  Under a nominal interest rate policy rule a
change in the money supply results from an endogenous change in the demand for money.  In that
7model the target rate of inflation is set equal to 1% per quarter.  We assume government balanced
budget so that all changes in money supply are financed by lump sum, per capita taxes or subsidies. 
At each date, firms hire labor in competitive markets, make investment decisions and select
optimal rates of capacity utilization of the capital they employ.  In making investments agents can
produce new capital goods by using their own savings or by borrowing on the open market to finance
these projects.  Investments are irreversible: once produced, capital goods cannot be turned back into
consumption goods but they depreciate with use.  Firms’ decisions maximize discounted present value
of future cash flow from producing consumer goods, given the nominal interest rate, the nominal
wage rate and the prices of consumer goods.  Markets for consumption good, labor and short term
bonds (or bills) are competitive and all prices are flexible: no prices are sticky.
Our model is then traditional.  There are no informational asymmetries. The main feature of
our theory is that agents hold diverse belief, not Rational Expectations.  Since an agent owns his firm,
we could bypass the firm problem by writing a grand household problem.  This is equivalent to
separating the household from the firm’s problem.  Such separate treatment is simple and contributes
to the clarity of the exposition hence we decentralize and discuss the two problems separately.
2.1 The Household Problem
Our model has two infinitely lived dynasties of agents enumerated j = 1, 2 but for simplicity
we shall refer to each one of them as “agents j” and introduce the following notation:
 -  consumption of  j  at  t; C jt
 -  price level or, the nominal price of a unit of the consumption good at t; Pt
   -  leisure of agent  j  at  t;
R
j
t
 -  labor employed by firm  j  at  t;L jt
 - nominal wage at t  t;   - the real wage at t;W˜t Wt '
W˜t
Pt
   - the mean level of technological productivity at t; ξt
 - number of units of capital owned by j and employed by the firm owned by j at date t;K jt
  -  real output by firm  j  of consumer goods at t;Y jt
 - gross nominal capital income of firm  j at t;Pt Y
j
t & W˜t L
j
t
 -  new investments of  j at date t;I jt
8 - total cash flow paid by the firm to j at t, perhaps negative; Pt f˜
j
t ' Pt Y
j
t & W˜t L
j
t & Pt I
j
t
  where   is the rate of inflation at t; 
Pt
Pt&1
' e
πt
πt
Bt
j - amount of one period nominal bill purchased by agent  j  at  t;
- the price of a one period bill at t, which is a discount price;qbt
 - amount of money held by agent j at t;M jt
  - rate of capacity utilization of firm  j;φjt
 Ht - history of all observables up to t.
Each household owns a firm with a production function which takes the form
(1) .Y jt ' e
υt (φjt K
j
t )
σ (ξtL
j
t )
1&σ
The productivity process  is a deterministic trend process satisfying  { ξt , t ' 1, 2...}
(2)  .
ξt%1
ξt
' υ
(
The random productivity is specified when we study the firm’s optimization.  A firm{υt%1 , t'1, 2,...}
carries out the household’s investment.  It maximizes the present value of cash flow and pays the
household an amount  , which the household considers exogenous.    isPt f˜
j
t ' Pt Y
j
t &W˜t L
j
t &Pt I
j
t Pt f˜
j
t
not “dividend” as it incorporates the household’s capital account and may be negative.
With exogenous money growth .   is a zero mean stochastic growth rate of
Mt%1
Mt
/ υ
(e
kt%1
kt%1
money.  Hence, in the case of exogenous money growth, the long term mean inflation rate in the
model is zero.  A similar condition applies to each agent.  That is 
(3)   for   j = 1, 2.M jt ' M
j
t&1υ
(e
kt
Under an interest rate policy money is endogenous.  If  j increases money holdings from  M jt&1 to M
j
t
he pays the government  units of consumption goods.  To maintain balanced budgetM jt /Pt&M
j
t&1/Pt
we introduce lump sum transfers  in units of consumption goods and make the "Ricardian"Ttξt
assumption that  equals the value of the newly issued money. Transfers per agent are equal.PtTtξt
9To ensure the existence of a steady state for the economy we assume the rate of discount and
degree of risk aversion are the same for all agents.  If  is a probability belief of  j  then he solvesQ j
(4a) Max EQ j [j
4
t'1
β
t&1 1
1 & γ
( C jt ( R
j
t )
ζ )1&γ % (
M jt
Pt
)1&γ | Ht ], 0 < β < 1
subject to two possible budget constraints.  Under an exogenous growth of the money the budgets are
(4b)       j = 1, 2.  PtC
j
t ' (1&R
j
t)W˜t % Pt f˜
j
t % B
j
t&1 % M
j
t&1υ
(e
kt
& B jt q
b
t & M
j
t
Under an interest rate rule the budget constraint are
 (4c)        j = 1, 2.PtC
j
t ' (1&R
j
t)W˜t % Pt f˜
j
t % B
j
t&1 % M
j
t&1 %
1
2
Pt(Ttξt) & B
j
t q
b
t & M
j
t
  
Normalizing, define ,  ,  ,  ,    c jt '
C jt
ξt
b jt '
B jt
Ptξt
, wt '
W˜t
Ptξt
i jt '
I jt
ξt
, f jt '
f˜
j
t
ξt
M jt
Ptξt
' m jt
M jt&1
Ptξt
'
m jt&1
e
πt
υ
(
hence the inflation rate  πt  is defined by  .  Using (4a)-(4c) the maximization problem is
Pt
Pt&1
' e
πt
(5a’)     Max EQ j j
4
t'1
β
t&1 1
1 & γ
[( c jt ξt ( R
j
t )
ζ)1&γ % ( m jt ξt )
1&γ | Ht], 0 < β < 1
subject to two possible budget constraints.  Under a money growth regime the budget constraints are
(5b’)   ,       j = 1, 2c jt ' (1 & R
j
t) wt % f
j
t % e
(kt&πt ) m jt&1 %
b jt&1 e
&πt
υ
(
& b jt q
b
t & m
j
t
and under a nominal interest rate rule regime they are
(5c’)   ,              j = 1, 2.c jt ' (1 & R
j
t) wt % f
j
t %
m jt&1 % b
j
t&1
υ
(e
πt
& b jt q
b
t & m
j
t %
1
2
Tt
The first order conditions are entirely standard.  For labor supply the conditions are (for j = 1, 2)
(6a) .c jt '
1
ζ
R
j
t wt
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The first order condition with respect to bond purchases    isbjt
(6b) .q bt ' EQ j [ β (υ
(
&γ )
c jt%1
c jt
&γ
R
j
t%1
R
j
t
ζ(1&γ)
e
&πt%1 ]
The optimum with respect to money holdings under a regime of monetary growth requires
(6c) 1 & (
m jt
c jt
)&γ
1
(Rjt )
ζ(1&γ)
' EQ j [ β(υ
(
&γ )
c jt%1
c jt
&γ
R
j
t%1
R
j
t
ζ(1&γ)
υ
(e
(kt%1&πt%1) ]
and under a regime of a monetary rule it requires
(6d)  .1 & (
m jt
c jt
)&γ
1
(Rjt )
ζ(1&γ)
' EQ j [ β (υ
(
&γ )
c jt%1
c jt
&γ
R
j
t%1
R
j
t
ζ(1&γ)
e
&πt%1 ]
Observe that firm j evaluates future cash flow with the stochastic discount rate of agent j defined by 
(7) .s jt%n,t ' [ (βυ
(
&γ )n
c jt%n
c jt
&γ
R
j
t%n
R
j
t
ζ(1&γ)
]
In all simulations we set  $ = 0.99 which is appropriate to a quarterly model; ( = 2.00 is a
realistic measure of risk aversion and . = 3.00 is the leisure elasticity.  . = 3.00 ensures the fraction of
time worked in steady states is around  0.225.  It implies an elasticity of labor supply (a so-called "8-
constant elasticity") of around 1.3 which is close to the empirical estimates of this elasticity.
2.1   Technology, Production and Investments
We first discuss key features of the production function as defined in (1).  The empirically
estimated distribution of the productivity  shocks is Markov of the form{υt%1 , t ' 1, 2,...}
υt%1 ' λυ υt % ρ
υ
t%1 , ρ
υ
t - N(0 , σ
2
υ
) i.i.d.
Productivity is the same across all firms.  Most studies estimate the quarterly mean rate of technical
change at  and this is the value we use.  The key parameters for the traditional RBCυ( ' 1.0045
literature are , set at  for quarterly data.  We agree with(σ ,λ
υ
,σ
υ
) σ ' 0.40 , λ
υ
'0.976 , σ
υ
'0.0072
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the critique (e.g. Summers (1986) and Eichenbaum (1991)) that technological shocks are only a
fraction of the Solow residual.  The implication is that  should be a fraction of  0.0072  and
σ
υ
accordingly, we set these parameters in our model at  and . σ ' 0.40 , λ
υ
' 0.976 σ
υ
' 0.003
However, for low values of  the RBC model cannot explain the observed data (see King and
σ
υ
Rebelo [1999], Fig. 8, page 965), and an alternative propagation mechanism is needed.   Examples of
such models within the RBC tradition include Wen (1998a), (1998b) and King and Rebelo (1999).
Capacity utilization was studied by writers such as Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman
(1988), Burnside Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1995), Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996), Basu (1996) and
others.  They show it is an important component of cyclical fluctuations.  We agree that under-
employed resources are central to economic fluctuations.  Indeed, a weak component of our model
(which we plan to correct in the future) is its failure to incorporate under- employed labor.  In the
absence of explicit labor unemployment, capacity utilization in our model should be taken as a
general proxy for factors which can be more intensely utilized when needed. 
Capital accumulation of  j  is described by a linear transition defined by
(8) K jt%1 ' (1 & ª (φ
j
t ) ) K
j
t % I
j
t , ª(φt ) ' δ¯ %
δ0
τ
φ
τ
t
where   is the rate of depreciation.  The empirical evidence about the elasticity τ  is mixed.  For
ª(φt )
example, King and Rebelo (1999) use the value  τ = 1.1  while Burnside and Eichenbaum (1996) 
estimate  τ = 1.56.   We set  τ  a bit smaller  τ = 1.3  to give some representation to potential under-
employed labor which is missing from our model.  The availability of under-employed resources
which can be mobilized in response to expectations is central to our approach.  The other two
parameters in (8) are determined by the data.  The mean rate of depreciation is 0.025 per quarter and
the mean rate of capacity utilization 0.80.  Hence we have the implied parameter restriction
     .δ¯ %
δ0
τ
( 0.8)τ ' 0.025
We show later that the last parameter is pinned down by our assumption that the economy has a
riskless steady state.  in (8) is investment of  j  measuring the number of new units of capital putI jt
into production at t+1.  We normalize  ,   ,  ,   and definek jt '
K jt
ξt
i jt '
I jt
ξt
wt '
W˜t
ξt Pt
y jt '
Y jt
ξt
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(9a)      y jt '
Y jt
ξt
' e
υt L jt
φ
j
t kt
L jt
σ
(9b) .k jt%1 '
(1 & ª (φjt ) )k
j
t % i
j
t
υ
(
The competitive firms carry out production and investment decisions using the stochastic
discount rate  in (7).  Gross real capital income of firm  j  is   .  It incurs reals jt%n,t Y
j
t & Wt L
j
t
investment cost of   hence at some dates the net cash flow may be negative.  It maximizesI jt
(10) Max
(L jt%n ,I
j
t%n ,φ
j
t%n )
EQ jt j
4
n' 0
s jt%n, t Y
j
t%n & Wt%n L
j
t%n & I
j
t%n | Ht
subject to (8), (9a)-(9b).  Changes to capacity utilization entail reorganization including engineering
design, plans for second shifts, etc.  Evidence shows such decisions are carried with delay.  We model
the planning period for capacity utilization changes to be three months.  We thus assume decisions on
capacity utilization at date t+1  are made at date t: a firm must commit to a utilization rate one
period ahead.  Such changes correspond to the process of investments where a firm commit at date t
to an investment plan which results in capital employed at date t +1.  Hence, a commitment to capital
and a commitment to a utilization rate are actually made together as they are naturally joint decisions.  
To state the first order conditions define first the normalized marginal productivity of factors 
.yL jt ' e
υt (1 & σ)
φ
j
t k
j
t
L jt
σ
yk jt ' e
υt
σ
φ
j
t k
j
t
L jt
σ&1
φ
j
t
Then the three Euler equations are as follows:
(10a)             0 ' yL jt & wt
(10b) 1 ' EQ jt s
j
t%1, t ( 1 % yk jt%1 & Î(n
j
t%1)
(10c) .0 ' EQ jt s
j
t%1, t ( yk jt%1 & δ0 [n
j
t%1]
τ)
(10c) determines capacity utilization but at steady state we require  hence (10c) imposes(nj)' 0.80
the final steady state condition    on the parameters .β(υ()&γσ (
0.80k j
L j
)σ&1 ' δ0 [0.80]
τ&1 ( δ¯ ,δ0 , τ )
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2.3  Monetary Policy and Money Neutrality
In the analysis of monetary policy we examine two family of models.  We first explore the
simple exogenous and stochastic monetary growth described by the familiar process
(11a) Mt ' Mt&1υ
(e
kt
(11b) .kt%1 ' λkkt % ρ
k
t%1
Since ,  we have .  The model of money injection is a bit unrealisticmt ' Mt /(ξt Pt) mt ' mt&1 e
(kt & πt )
as it hard to see a central bank distributing money to cash holders when  and extracting it whenkt > 0
.  Also, since there is no one “money” it is not clear which of the near moneys a bank should
kt < 0
control.  In spite of these drawbacks the monetary shocks model is a useful idealization.  It provides a
reference point to measure the efficacy of monetary policy in economies with a monetary rule.  
We next study economies with nominal interest rate rule.  A central bank sets , theq bt '
1
1% rt
price of the nominal bill, where  rt  is the nominal rate.  The inflation rate target is assumed 1% per
quarter.  In the simulations we consider the performance of a Taylor (1993) type policy rules with and
without discretion and inertia which we present and discuss in Section 5.  The balanced budget
condition under the proposed policy rule requires the lump-sum tax or subsidy rates to satisfy
(13)  .mt &
mt&1
e
πt
υ
(
' Tt
A Comment On Money Neutrality.  
In a model with monetary shocks the date t + 1 shock is not known at t.  However,  once a
shock is realized, agents observe it and equilibrium prices adjust to it.  This means that although
unanticipated monetary shocks are included in the model, under REE unanticipated shocks have no
real effect.  The reason is that under REE agents know the true distribution of the shocks and expect
money to be neutral: the price level fully adjusts and agents correctly expect prices to adjust.  Hence,
our model is strongly biased in favor of money neutrality.  However, this mechanism does not work
in an RBE where agents expect money shocks to have real effect but disagree about the magnitude of
these real effects.  An important channel for money non neutrality in the RBE is the belief of an agent
that these shocks will affect the belief of other agents about the future course of the economy.  
To conclude this discussion we observe that even if we wanted to introduce real effect of
unanticipated shock under REE, we would need to introduce some friction or delay in the response of
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prices to realized and observed shocks.  We do not address this issue here.  We study economies in
which monetary policy is conducted with a  nominal interest rate rule and in such economies the
mechanism described above is not relevant.  In fact, in an economy with a monetary rule the money
neutrality phenomenon is actually one of a dichotomy between the real and monetary parts of the
economy.  For monetary policy to have a real effect this dichotomy must be broken. 
2.4 Market Clearing Conditions
The market clearing conditions are then
(14a) for all t;b 1t % b
2
t ' 0
(14b)  for all t;(1 & R1t ) % (1 & R
2
t ) ' L
1
t % L
2
t
(14d) for the money shock model for all t.m 1t % m
2
t ' mt
(14e) for the interest rule model for all t.mt &
mt&1
e
πt
υ
(
' τft
We turn now to the central question of the beliefs of the agents.
3. Constructing a Rational Belief Equilibrium (RBE)
3.1 The State of Belief and the Equilibrium Map
The environment of a typical RBE is non-stationary and agents believe the economic structure
vary over time hence a general treatment of such economies is complex.  To simplify we study
monetary policy by constructing a broad family of equilibria and examine the impact of alternative
policies on their volatility.  The family is defined by an autoregressive stochastic law of motion of the
state variables and by the structure of agents’ beliefs.  Since this is a theoretical paper, one needs to
consider these specifications mainly as vehicles to develop the central ideas. 
To define an RBE consider the economy as a data generating mechanism so that from past
data agents know the empirical distribution of observables.  A Rational Belief is a probability
measure on sequences of future states together with a model of the economy.  It has the property that
if simulated, it generates the same empirical distribution of observables as the known distribution for
the economy.  Conditional forecasts may be wrong at any date but their time average is correct.  The
6 The empirical distribution of observable variables or their moments induce a probability measure over
infinite sequences of observables. A general definition and construction of this probability measure is explained in
Kurz (1997a) or Kurz-Motolese (2001) where it is shown that this probability must be stationary. Any statement in
the text about “the stationary measure” or “the empirical distribution” is always a reference to this probability
measures.  Its centrality to the theory arises from the fact that it is derived from public information and hence this
probability is known to all agents.
7 For a detailed account of the theory of Rational Beliefs see Kurz (1997a) and for additional details
regarding the constructive approach to RBE, see Kurz and Motolese (2001), Section 2.4.
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probability on sequences implied by the empirical distribution is called The Stationary Measure6.  To
use these concepts we need a tractable way to describe beliefs and this is our main task now.   
The tool we use to describe the distribution of beliefs at t is the “market state of belief.”  In a
two agent economy it is a vector  which uniquely defines date  t  conditionalzt ' ( z
1
t , z
2
t ) 0 ú
2
probability functions of the agents.  In any equilibrium endogenous variables are functions of state
variables, lagged endogenous variables.  In our case we add .  If we denote exogenous(z 1t , z
2
t )
shocks and lagged endogenous variables by  ,  the process { , t = 1, 2, ...} ofjt (q
b
t , πt , Tt )
equilibrium prices and tax transfers is defined by a map like
(15) .
qb
πt
Tt
' Ξ(jt , z
1
t , z
2
t )
Our equilibrium is a Radner (1972) equilibrium with an expanded state space that includes the state
of belief .  The map (15) reflects this fact.  Since agents use a price map to forecast future(z 1t , z
2
t )
prices, they forecast future market state of beliefs, which are the future beliefs of  “other” agents. 
Although both agents use the map  Ξ  in (15) to forecast  t+1 prices, their price forecasts are different
since each agent forecasts future state variables and future market beliefs given his own private state
of belief.  We explore this issue in detail later when we discuss the subjective models of the agents. 
Our procedure is to construct an RBE, use perturbation methods to compute it and study its
volatility via simulations.  Since we wish to demonstrate our economy exhibits fluctuations which are
qualitatively similar to those observed in the market, our construction proceeds in three steps7.  
(i) Specify a family of empirical distributions of state variables which is then assumed known to
agents who learn it from the data.  Most parameter selections are based on their estimated values,
known from other studies.  Some values are based on our best judgement.
8 A Stable Process is defined in Kurz (1994).  It is a stochastic process which has an empirical
distribution defined by the limits of relative frequencies of finite dimensional events.  These limits are used to
define the empirical distribution and to construct the associated stationary measure on infinite sequences. 
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(ii) Specify the beliefs of agents and formulate conditions which rationalize them relative to the
empirical distribution specified in (i).  These are the rationality conditions of the RBE.
(iii) Use the equilibrium conditions developed earlier to define prices and endogenous variables. 
3.2 The Empirical Distribution of the State
In a Markov economy a probability is represented by transition functions.  In our constructed
RBE the state variables are , hence to define an empirical distribution we specify(υt ,kt , z
1
t , z
2
t )
stationary transition functions for these variables.  The true process of the shocks { , t = 1,(υt , kt )
2,...} is an unspecified, stable8 and non-stationary process, incorporating structural changes with a
probability law which is not known.  Indeed, for equilibrium analysis the true process does not
matter: what matters is the empirical distribution of the process and what agents believe about the
true process.  We assume the joint empirical distribution of the exogenous shocks and the states of
belief is an AR process of the form
(16)        ,       i.i.d.
υt%1 ' λυυt % ρ
υ
t%1
kt%1 ' λkkt % ρ
k
t%1
z 1t%1 ' λz1z
1
t % λ
z 1
υ
υt % λ
z 1
k
kt % ρ
z 1
t%1
z 2t%1 ' λz2z
2
t % λ
z 2
υ
υt % λ
z 2
k
kt % ρ
z 2
t%1
ρ
υ
t
ρ
k
t
ρ
z 1
t
ρ
z 2
t
-N
0
0
0
0
,
σ
2
υ
, 0 , 0 , 0
0 , σ2
k
, 0 , 0
0 , 0 , 1 , σz 1z 2
0 , 0 , σz 1z 2 , 1
In (16) states of belief may depend upon exogenous shocks. As noted, . Moneyλ
υ
'0.976 , σ
υ
'0.003
shock parameters are from Mankiw and Reis’s [2002] who estimate .  To specify
λ
k
'0.5 , σ
k
'0.007
parameters of the  zj equations we used forecasts of the Survey of Professional Forecasters and Blue
Chip Indicators and“purged” them of observables.  By estimating principal components we handle
multiple variables forecasted (for details, see Fan (2003)).  The extracted belief indexes exhibit
autocovariances of 0.5 - 0.8.  We set   where .  The data exhibit high
λz ' 0.65 λz ' λz 1 ' λz 2
correlations across agents and 0.9  is a reasonable estimate of . σz 1z 2
We consider here only the symmetric case  and .  Evidence revealsλz
1
υ
' λ
z 2
υ
' λ
z
υ
λ
z 1
k
' λ
z 2
k
' λ
z
k
that above normal productivity shocks lead to upward revisions of the mean growth of the economy,
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 implying  .  In the simulations we set   We have little evidence on the value of   whichλz
υ
> 0 λz
υ
' 8. λz
k
has an important money non-neutrality impact.  We set  and the empirical reasoning which leads toλz
k
' 8
assuming  is simple: for positive money shocks to induce positive response of output andλz
k
> 0
consumption we must have .  This means that positive monetary shocks at  t  lead agents to expectλz
k
> 0
above normal  hence above normal future output.  Finally, we denote by  m  the probability measurez jt%1
on infinite sequences implied by (16) together with the invariant distribution as an initial distribution. 
To write (16) in a compact notation let  ,  and denote by xt ' (υt , kt , z
1
t , z
2
t ) ρt ' (ρ
υ
t , ρ
k
t , ρ
z 1
t , ρ
z 2
t )
A  the 4×4 matrix of parameters in (16).  We then write
(17) xt%1 ' Axt % ρt%1 , ρt%1 - N( 0 , Σ )
where  G  is the covariance matrix in (16).  Denote by V  the 4×4  unconditional covariance of   x 
defined by .   We later need the value of  V and compute it as solution of the equationV ' Em( xxN )
(18)  .V ' AVAN % Σ
3.3 Personal States of Belief and the Anonymity Principle
In a non-stationary environment an agent’s conditional probability belief is time dependent,
deviating from the stationary forecasts of the empirical probability.  His belief may be above the empirical
probability (he is “optimistic”) or below it (he is “pessimistic”).  Since the rationality principle requires the
time average of the agent’s belief to equal the empirical probability, his periodic probability beliefs
fluctuate around the empirical probability.  We need a tractable mathematical description of such non-
stationary dynamics while not providing reasons why an agent selects any particular belief.  We only seek
a way to describe market diversity. 
Our main tool is the individual state of belief   of  j.  It is an index which fully specifies hisg jt 0 G
j
conditional probability function at each date.  The advantage of this sequence is statistical since the
stochastic structure specifies the empirical regularity of  in relation to observables.  Since rationalg jt
agents do not deviate systematically from the empirical forecasts, to establish rationality of belief we need
a statistical measure of deviations from these forecasts.   are the mathematical devices used tog jt 0 G
j
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measure such regularity.  Before proceeding we offer an economic interpretation of this key tool.
3.3a Interpreting the State of Belief: Some Examples
The RB principle applies to a wide range of models agents employ to form belief.  To explain
what states of belief  or  are, we consider three examples which illustrate how to think about them. g jt z
j
t
(i)  Measure of Animal Spirit.  The idea of “Animal Spirit” captures the intensity at which agents carry
out investments.  However, investments decisions are deduced from beliefs about rewards.    identifiesg jt
the probability an agent assigns to abnormally high or abnormally low values of rewards to investments. 
Since rewards motivate “animal spirit,” the parameter  is interpreted as a measure of  “animal spirit.”g jt
(ii) Posterior parameter value defining regime variables.  In a learning context each member of a
dynasty starts with a prior on a joint space of observables and unknown parameters defining structural
changes.  One can then identify  with the posterior parameter deduced from the observations made byg jt
a dynasty member.  When a new member of the dynasty arrives,  he starts with the same prior but
assumes a change of regime hence past data does not apply to parameters he tries to learn.  Persistence of 
 results from the accumulated learning during the life span of a member.  No convergence occurs sinceg jt
the life span of each regime is short.
(iii) Subjective and privately generated sunspot which depend upon real economic variables.    mayg jt
play the role of a privately generated sunspot with three properties (a) each agent generates it under a
true marginal distribution known only to him, (b)  it is not observed by the other agents in the market,
and (c) the distribution of this variable may depend upon real economic variables.  It is clear these
conditions do not satisfy the traditional definition of “sunspot” variables.  Moreover, the structure of
correlation in the market is an externality, not known to agents.  That is, an agent does not know the true
correlation between his own  and real variables or with subjective sunspots of other agents. Under thisg jt
interpretation  is a substantial extension of the notion of a “sunspot” variable.g jt
We stress that   are privately perceived by agent  j  only.  Since a dynasty consists of ag jt
sequence of decision makers, a  used by  j  has nothing to do with the beliefs of other dynastyg jt
members.   and for  do not need to be the same spaces: an agent’s theory about investing inG j G k j…k
technology of one era (when j lives) has little to do with investments in a different era (when k lives). 
Unfortunately, diversity of   for   is not tractable.  For tractability we make twoG j … G k j…k
9 This requirement on the agent is analogous to the behavior of producers in a competitive market with a
finite number of firms who are required to disregard their impact on prices.  By looking at past data a competitive
firm in a market with a finite number of firms can demonstrate that it had an effect on prices in violation of this
assumption.  This type of empirical “test” is what is assumed away here to ensure competitive behavior of agents.
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assumptions.  First, we use the same space   for all  j and assume an agent knows only the shortG j ' ú
history of his own states  but does not know the  of his predecessors  τ < t.  Second, we assumeg jt g
j
τ
individual states are made public and their distribution   is recorded as a “market state of(z 1t , z
2
t )
beliefs” subject to anonymity of the individuals behind the data.  To maintain competitive markets each
agent is assumed to disassociate his own belief from the market state.  Due to the finite number of agents
in the model (two in our case) this anonymity assumption needs some clarification.
3.3b Anonymity
Although the market state of beliefs at t is nothing but a distribution of the , anonymity requiresg jt
that agents do not make any connection between their own  and the distribution of beliefs in theg jt
market9.  Anonymity is so central that we use three notational devices to highlight it.
(i)     denotes the state of belief of  j  as known by the agent only. g jt
(ii)    denotes the market state of belief, observed by all agents.  Being competitive, they(z 1t , z
2
t )
do not associate  with  although   is a basic consistency condition. y jt (z
1
t , z
2
t ) g
j
t ' z
j
t
(iii)  describes agent  j’s  forecast of the market state of belief at future date t+1.(z j1t%1 , z
j2
t%1 )
To formulate the rationality of belief conditions we specify a sequence of individual states { , t = 1, 2,g jt
...} for  j = 1, 2.   The consistency condition  (not known by agents) requires the empiricalg jt ' z
j
t
distribution of  to be the same as the distribution of  .  Thus, the agent’s belief is characterized by ag jt z
j
t
sequence of random variables  such that { , t = 1, 2, ...} are the realizations ofρ˜g
j
t , t ' 1 ,2 , . . . g
j
t
(19) .g jt%1 ' λzg
j
t % λ
z
υ
υt % λ
z
k
kt % ρ˜
g j
t%1 , ρ˜
g j
t%1 - N( 0 , σ˜
2
g j
) , j ' 1 ,2
(19) is compatible with the equation in (16) but by anonymity  . z jt Cov(ρ˜
g j
t%1 ,ρ
z 1
t%1)'Cov(ρ˜
g j
t%1 ,ρ
z 2
t%1)'0
Since { , t = 1, 2, ...} exhibit serial correlation, the rationality of belief require that we exclude from g jt g
j
t
public information in the market at  t.  To that end we introduce a variable , defined as follows. u jt ( g
j
t )
Denote by  the covariance vector in the agent’s model and using (18) define  byrj ' Cov(x , g
j ) u jt ( g
j
t )
10 From the perspective of the agent a sequence is just a sequence of parameters.  However, for theseg jt
rationality conditions we need to study the empirical distribution of sequences { , t = 1, 2,...)} whichΨt%1(u
j
t )
depend upon the .  In order to do that we need to know the empirical regularity of the  and this is where theu jt g
j
t
specification (19), about the statistical regularity of these assessment variables, come into play.
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(20) .u jt (g
j
t ) ' g
j
t & r
N
j V
&1xt
By construction, the pure belief index  is uncorrelated with date t information.  In Appendix B weu jt ( g
j
t )
demonstrate that it is also serially uncorrelated.  We stress:  acquires meaning only after weu jt ( g
j
t )
specify what j does in state .  The formal structure to do that are the perception models of the agents.g jt
3.4 Perception Models and the Rationality of Belief Conditions
3.4a General Formulation
A perception model is a set of transition functions of the state variables, reflecting the agent’s
belief about date t+1 transition probability.  We first explain the general form of a perception model,
using (17), providing details later.  Let  be a vector of stochastic state variables at date t+1 asx jt%1
perceived by agent  j and let  be a  4  dimensional vector of date t+1 random variablesΨt%1(u
j
t )
conditional upon parameter .    A perception model has the general formu jt
(21a)    together with    (19).x jt%1 ' Axt % Ψt%1( u
j
t )
Since  ,  we write (21a) in the simpler formEm( xt%1 | Ht) ' Axt
(21b)     .x jt%1 & Em( xt%1 | Ht) ' Ψt%1(u
j
t )
In general  hence j’s  forecast function changes with  .  (21b) shows how agent  j’sE[Ψt%1|u
j
t ] … 0 u
j
t
forecasts deviate from  and how the deviations depends upon .  If   as inEm( xt%1 | Ht) u
j
t Ψt%1(u
j
t ) ' ρt%1
(17),   j  uses the empirical probability  m  as his belief.  We can now explain the rationality of belief
conditions requiring the empirical distributions of (17) and (21a) to be the same.  For  [xt%1&Em( xt%1 |Ht)]
to have the same empirical distribution as  means the empirical distribution of[x jt%1&Em(xt%1 |Ht)]
{ , t = 1, 2,...)} in (21a) is the same as the distribution of   in (17), which is N(0, G).  ThisΨt%1(u
j
t ) ρt%1
implies that the empirical distribution of { , t = 1, 2,...)} is N(0, G)10 and that  does notΨt%1(u
j
t ) Ψt%1(u
j
t )
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exhibit serial correlation.  We now explain the details of these requirements.
  
3.4b The Perception Models
In modeling   we consider several factors.  In an RBE agents may be over-confident byΨt%1(u
j
t )
being optimistic or pessimistic relative to the empirical  forecasts.  Evidence from the psychological
literature (e.g. Svenson (1981), Camerer and Lovallo (1999) and references there) shows agents exhibit
such behavior.  Since in an RBE agents do not know  true probabilities, such behavior is not “ irrational”
if it respects the rationality principle.   Also, rationality requires  to be serially uncorrelated.Ψt%1(u
j
t )
To address these issues we specify the random sequence  to take the simple formΨt%1(u
j
t )
 
(22) Ψt%1(u
j
t ) '
λ
υ
gρ
j
t%1 (u
j
t ) % ρ˜
υ
j
t%1
λ
k
gyρ
j
t%1 (u
j
t ) % ρ˜
k
j
t%1
λ
z
gρ
j
t%1 (u
j
t ) % ρ˜
z j1
t%1
λ
z
gρ
j
t%1 (u
j
t ) % ρ˜
z j2
t%1
where   are i.i.d. zero mean, normal variables with covariance matrix   toρ˜j(t%1) ' ( ρ˜
υ
j
t%1 , ρ˜
k
j
t%1 , ρ˜
z j1
t%1 , ρ˜
z j2
t%1 ) Ω
ρρ
be pinned down by the rationality conditions.   has dimension 4×4, as does  G  in (17).  However, a
Ω
ρρ
perception model incorporates as a fifth dimension with a covariance matrix denoted by ,  reflectingy jt Ω
the vector   for  i = 1, 2, 3, 4 .  The parameters  are the main object ofr ij ' Cov(x
i , g j ) λg ' (λ
υ
g , λ
k
g , λ
z
g )
our study and their effect on volatility is examined later.  Since we study only the symmetric case,  the
state of belief is the only difference between agents.  We next construct the random variables . ρjt%1(u
j
t )
 The Random Variables : Intensity of Fat Tails in the Agent’s BeliefsΨ jt%1
The  variables   are the tools which enable agents to exhibit subjective beliefs with "fat"ρjt%1(u
j
t )
tails, reflecting over-confidence.  We define  by specifying its density, conditional on :ρjt%1(u
j
t ) u
j
t
(23)        where      .P(ρjt%1 |u
j ) '
φ1( u
j )Φ(ρjt%1 ) if ρ
j
t%1 $ 0
φ2(u )Φ(ρ
j
t%1 ) if ρ
j
t%1 < 0
Φ(s) ' 1
2π
e
&
s 2
2
 and   (in (19))  are independent and we use a logistic approximation to defineρjt%1 ρ˜
g j
t%1
(24)    ,   b < 0   ,     ,   .ψ(u j) '
1
1 % e bu
j(g j)
B ' E[ψ(u j)] φ1(u) '
ψ(u)
B
, φ2(u) ' 2 & φ1(u)
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(24) ensures that (23) is a probability density.  Technical details are developed in Appendix A but we note
here that this construction depends upon one parameter  b. 
Although a key question, we defer the explanation of what  means.  (23)-(24) is a formalu jt > 0
description of “over confidence” (relative to the empirical distribution) via . When and large,ρjt%1 u
j
t > 0
 is also large: an agent is over confident that takes positive values with high probability.  Heψ(u j) ρjt%1
multiplies the positive part of a normal density in (23) by and the negative part by . φ1(u
j
t ) > 1 φ2(u
j
t ) < 1
When  the opposite occurs: agent j is over confident that  take negative values with highu jt < 0 ρ
j
t%1
probability but now  and .  The amplifications  are determined by uj φ1(u
j
t ) < 1 φ2(u
j
t ) > 1 (φ1(u
j) ,φ2(u
j) )
and by the “fat tails” parameter  b.  Figure 1 exhibits two non normal densities of  for  uj > 0 andρj (u j)
for  uj < 0.  As  varies, the densities of  change.  But the empirical distribution of  isu jt ρ
j
t%1 (u
j
t ) u
j
normal.  Hence, as uj varies over time, averaging the densities  over   generates a randomρj (u j) u j
variable which is normal and its empirical distribution is drawn in the center of Figure 1. 
FIGURE 1 PLACE HERE
As (22) shows, each component of  is a sum of two random variables.  The first is as inΨt%1(u
j
t )
Figure 1 and the second is normal.  Figure 2 exhibits two densities of the  υ  component of ,Ψt%1(u
j
t )
assuming .  Each is a convolution of a normal density with a density as in Figure 1: one for uj > 0λυg > 0
and one for uj < 0, showing each has a “fat tail” relative to the empirical distribution which is normal. 
Since the parameter b measures the intensity by which the positive and negative portions in Figure1 are
shifted, it measures the degree of fat tails in the distribution of . The fat tail parameter b is centralΨt%1(u
j
t )
as it regulates the intensity of the agents’ over confidence about future distributions of the state variables. 
Such variations in the bullish or bearish outlook of future economic events relative to the empirical
distribution is the driving force of our model. 
FIGURE 2 PLACE HERE
We finally arrive at the key question of what do uj > 0 or uj < 0 mean?  We have shown that
when uj > 0 agent  j  is over confident that take positive values and when uj < 0 he is overρjt%1 (u
j
t )
confident that  take negative values.  But then what does  or  mean?  ρjt%1 (u
j
t ) ρ
j
t%1 (u
j
t ) > 0 ρ
j
t%1 (u
j
t ) < 0
Keeping in mind that  determines the belief via a single factor  in all equations in (22), theu jt ρt%1(u
j
t )
answer is clear from (22): it depends upon the component of  we consider and what is the signΨt%1(u
j
t )
of the corresponding parameter.  This fact justifies the following definition:λg ' (λ
υ
g , λ
k
g , λ
z
g )
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• If   agent j is said to be optimistic or over confident that  λυg > 0 υt%1 > Em[υt%1 |Ht]
• If   agent j is said to be optimistic or over confident that λkg > 0 kt%1 > Em[kt%1 |Ht]
• If   agent j is said to be optimistic or over confident that  ,  n = 1 , 2.λzg > 0 z
jn
t%1 > Em[z
jn
t%1 | Ht]
We now specify that .  This orients the model so that uj > 0  means agents are optimistic orλυg>0 , λ
k
g $ 0
over confident in expecting abnormally high productivity shocks and abnormally high monetary shocks. 
We stress that such orientation is a matter of model convention rather than a model assumption.
The questions we ask are then clear: can we find feasible values of the parameters such that the
model replicates the empirical record of the U.S. economy?  Moreover, if fluctuations in the economy are
caused by endogenous forces as in our model, what are the policy implications of such equilibria? 
The final form of the subjective perception model is then
(25)
υ
j
t%1 ' λ
υ
υt % λ
υ
yρ
j
t%1(u
j
t ) % ρ˜
υ
j
t%1
k
j
t%1 ' λ
k
kt % λ
k
yρ
j
t%1(u
j
t ) % ρ˜
k
j
t%1
z j1t%1 ' λzz
1
t % λ
z
υ
υt % λ
z
k
kt % λ
z
yρ
j
t%1( u
j
t ) % ρ˜
z j1
t%1
z j2t%1 ' λzz
2
t % λ
z
υ
υt % λ
z
k
kt % λ
z
yρ
j
t%1( u
j
t ) % ρ˜
z j2
t%1
g jt%1 ' λzg
j
t % λ
z
υ
υt % λ
z
k
kt % ρ˜
g j
t%1 .
The vector    is distributed  i.i.d. Normal with mean zero and covariance matrix    to be specified.  ρ˜jt Ω
The important parameter   reflects forecasts of the beliefs of others.  Assuming ,  ifλzg λ
υ
g>0 λ
k
g $ 0
then an optimistic agent (with ) expects others to have above normal level of optimism atλzg > 0 u
j
t > 0
t+1.  But from (19) he also expects to be less optimistic than others.  When  an optimistic agentλzg < 0
expects others to have a lower than normal level of optimism and for himself to be more optimistic than
others.  We show later that  is needed to ensure the model generates sufficient positive correlationλzg < 0
between consumption and output.  Also,  heterogeneous forecasts of the belief of others (z k1t%1 , z
k2
t%1)
leads to heterogeneous forecasts of price and other endogenous variables.  This is so since equilibrium
prices depend on .  This heterogeneity is a key force which generate efficacy of a monetary(z 1t%1 , z
2
t%1)
rule since it is the cause for breaking the dichotomy between the real and monetary parts of the economy. 
 
The Rationality of Belief Conditions
As noted before, the  rationality principle requires that 
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(26)    has the same joint empirical distribution as  .Ψt%1(u
j
t ) '
λ
υ
gρ
j
t%1 (u
j
t ) % ρ˜
υ
j
t%1
λ
k
gρ
j
t%1 (u
j
t ) % ρ˜
k
j
t%1
λ
z
gρ
j
t%1 (u
j
t ) % ρ˜
z j1
t%1
λ
z
gρ
j
t%1 (u
j
t ) % ρ˜
z j2
t%1
ρt%1 '
ρ
υ
t%1
ρ
k
t%1
ρ
z 1
t%1
ρ
z 2
t%1
In  Appendix B we show: (a) the main restriction the rationality principle imposes on beliefs is that it pins
down the covariance matrix  S  of , and (b) that  is serially uncorrelated.  However, if  S   is aρ˜jt Ψt%1(u
j
t )
covariance matrix then it must be positive definite.  This is the last point to explore.
3.4c Positive Definiteness of Ω as a Restriction of the Rationality conditions
Although the parameters  are free, are drastically restricted(b , λg ) where λg ' (λ
υ
g , λ
k
g , λ
z
g) (b , λg )
by the condition that  Ω  is positive definite.  To see why, observe some implications of this condition:
• σ
υ
 = 0.003  implies .  The covariance structure further restricts  .  |λυg | < 0.003 |λ
υ
g | < 0.0027
• σ
k
 = 0.007 implies .  The covariance structure further restricts  .|λkg | < 0.007 |λ
k
g | < 0.0032
• The covariance structure implies that   .|λzg | < 0.35
• The overconfidence parameter b has a feasible range between  0  and   -12.
3.4d Model Parameters and Their Interpretation
 The model parameters  for our reference economy with random money growth can be(b , λg )
specified: b = -10 , ,  and .   Apart from  all parameter are takenλυg ' 0.0025 λ
k
g ' 0 λ
z
g ' &0.30 λ
k
g ' 0
close to the maximal values feasible under the restriction that  Ω  be positive definite.  To explain these,
note   is compatible with our specified convention.  We could extend the possibility ofλυg ' 0.0025 > 0
optimism to monetary shocks but for simplicity we assume agents know money injection is implemented
by a computer and they know that (11a)-(11b) is the truth, hence .  As for the last two parameters:λkg ' 0
b  < 0   -   for uj > 0  to mean “optimism,”  ψ  in (24) must increase with uj  hence we must have b  < 0;
  - since “optimism” by  j  is a belief in higher investment returns, it turns out such reasoning alsoλzg < 0
calls for expecting lower cost of production at t+1.  It is realized if tomorrow other agents’ level
of optimism is below normal since such market state of belief induces lower wages and higher
profits tomorrow.  In addition,    is needed for the model to fit the empirical evidence.λzg < 0
11 Results for the standard RBC model with σ
υ
 = 0.0072 are from  King and Rebelo (1999, Table 3).  Data
for the U.S. economy are from Stock and Watson (1999) except for inflation which is measured by the GNP
deflator and which we computed for the entire period 1947:1 - 2003:2.  Stock and Watson (1999) computed the
data for the period 1953:1-1996:4.  
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4. The Role of Technology, Expectation and Money Shocks in Economic Fluctuations
4.1 On Computational Procedures
We turn to examine economic fluctuations.  Our computations employ a program developed by
Hehui Jin (see Jin and Judd (2002) and Jin (2003) ) for computing equilibria using perturbation methods.
A solution is declared an equilibrium if the following holds: (i)  a model is approximated by at least
second order derivatives, and  (ii) errors in market clearing conditions and Euler equations are less than
.  Since steady state consumption is about  0.7  the permitted error is 1/500 of this marginal utility. 10&3
 4.2 Business Cycle Fluctuations in the Model with Money Shocks
We start by comparing, in Table 1, the volatility of the classical RBC model under REE (without
capacity utilization) with the volatility of the RBE with money shocks. The table shows that although  σ
υ
is a fraction of  0.072, the RBE reproduces well the U.S. empirical record.   As anticipated, our model
does not perform well in the labor market.  Since it does not have sufficient resource under-employment
it does not capture the low volatility of the wage rate, the low correlation between the wage rate and
GNP and the high volatility of hours.  However, these shortcomings of the model do not diminish its
value for the study of monetary policy.
Table 1: Comparing the Volatility of the RBE with the Classical RBC11
(percent, all data H-P filtered)
     Standard Deviation of Variable  Correlation of Variable with GNP
Variable RBC with
σ
υ
 = 0.0072
 U.S. data RBE with 
σ
υ
 = 0.003
RBC with
σ
υ
 = 0.0072
 U.S. data RBE with
σ
υ
 = 0.003
    Y
     I 
    C
    L
   W
    π
    1.39
    4.09
    0.61
    0.67
    0.75
     na
     1.81
     5.30
     1.35
     1.79
     0.68
     1.79
    1.82
    5.24
    0.93
    1.02
    1.05
    2.91
     1.00
     0.99
     0.94
     0.97
     0.98
      na
     1.00
     0.80
     0.88
     0.88
     0.12
     0.24
    1.00
    0.94
    0.73
    0.87
    0.88
    0.33
The correlation between consumption and GNP is a central problem in an RBE and reveals the
complexity of dynamics when fluctuations are propagated by expectations.  In a standard RBC model a
high correlation among aggregate variables results from the large persistent technological shocks which 
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increase GNP, investments and consumption together.  When expectations of high future returns drive
high investment rate, a competitive force emerges between investment and consumption.   A date t
increased output which is associated with increased agent’s expected return on investments leads to
increased investment but tends to reduce date t consumption.  This force leads to a negative correlation
between consumption and GNP.   Kurz, Jin and Motolese (2003) show the potential dominance of this
factor.  An opposite force operates when increased investments together with increased capacity
utilization result in higher date t+1 output, making increased output and consumption possible, causing
positive correlation between them. Such positive correlation is driven by persistence in beliefs which
generate the higher investments and capacity utilization to begin with.  Persistence of beliefs expressed
by  and the condition   are both needed for the positive  0.72 correlationλz'0.65,λ
z
υ
'8.00 λzg'&0.30
between output and consumption seen in Table 1.
 Economic fluctuations in our RBE are caused by three factors: technology, expectations and
monetary shocks.  What are the contributions of these factors to the observed fluctuations in the U.S.?
4.2a Decomposing the Effect of Technology, Expectations and Money Shocks
In Table 2 we answer the question above.  is the standard deviation of X and  is theσX ρ(X, Y)
correlation of  X  with GNP.  Column 1 reproduces the data in Table 1.  Next, we shut off the random
money shock by setting  hence money grows at a constant rate   Column  3 reports results forσ
k
'0 υ(.
the REE with constant money growth and flexible capacity utilization.  If we think of  REE volatility as
measuring the effect of technology, then we arrive at the following rough approximation: 
           Table 2: Decomposing the Components of Business Cycles 
(percent,   all data H-P filtered)
    RBE with Random 
       Money Growth
   RBE with Constant 
     Money Growth
   REE with Constant 
     Money Growth
 X                                 σX ρ(X , Y) σX ρ(X , Y) σX ρ(X , Y)
Y
I
C
L
W
π
  1.82          1.00
  5.24          0.94
  0.93          0.73
  1.02          0.87
  1.05          0.88
  2.91          0.33
  1.75             1.00   
  5.02             0.95   
  0.89             0.74
  0.97             0.88
  1.01             0.89
  1.60             0.57
   0.81              1.00   
   1.97              0.99
   0.39              0.99
   0.33              0.99
   0.48              0.99
   0.73            - 0.10
• 40% of real fluctuations in the model are due to technological shocks and capacity utilization;
•   4% of real fluctuations are due to random monetary shocks amplified by agents’ expectations;
• 56% of real fluctuations in the model are demand driven, due to pure expectations of agents.
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Recall that prices adjust immediately to a change in the money supply hence the REE is strongly
neutral: unanticipated effects of money are impossible.  Nevertheless, the effect of money in Table 2 is
of interest as it measures a hypothetical level of fluctuations attained by suppressing the impact of
market expectations via the elimination of random shocks to the money supply.  This level is then a
basic and plausible yardstick for the success of any monetary policy rule to be discussed later.
4.2b Money non-Neutrality, Phillips Curve and Sticky prices in the RBE 
The RBE reported in Tables 1 and 2 is the basic reference economy which we study later under
alternative monetary rules.  Hence, we discuss two  monetary properties of this economy. 
(i) Phillips Curve Behavior.  By simulating 10,000 observations of the reference economy we can
estimate the following statistical Phillips Curve which is compatible with many published estimates:
(27)        .πt & π
(
' 0.1754[log( yt ) & log(y
( )] % 0.4272[πt&1 & π
( ] % 0.0227[πt&2 & π
( ]
(ii)  Money is Non-Neutral in an RBE and Prices Appear Sticky.  Money non-neutrality and impulse
response behavior in an RBE were discussed by Kurz, Jin and Motolese (2003).  We add here that in a
heterogenous belief economy agents have diverse belief about the effects of monetary shocks.  Hence
money shocks may generate an increase or a decrease of output and consumption, depending upon the
structure of market beliefs.   is then a sufficient condition which ensures that a positive moneyλz
k
> 0
shock causes a positive impulse of real variables.  This condition says a positive money shock leads
agents to expect an increased level of market confidence.  Since prices and endogenous variables are
functions of , forecasts of  are indirectly forecasts of future prices and endogenous(z 1t , z
2
t ) (z
1
t%1 , z
2
t%1 )
variables.  In addition, when agents are confident about the future they increase their consumption and
demand for money. Hence, a positive monetary shock which leads to increased forecast of (z 1t%1 , z
2
t%1 )
actually leads to an increase in the demand for money and thus reduces the inflationary impact of the
monetary shock.  We arrive at this same conclusion by examining the equilibrium inflation function πt
which depend upon kt.  Indeed,  is the proportion of a money shock translated into inflation.  In an 
Mπt
Mkt
REE,  but in our reference   RBE, .  An econometrician studying the relationship
Mπt
Mkt
'1
Mπt
Mkt
'0.82
between money shocks and inflation in this RBE may conclude that prices are sticky since they do not
respond fully to money shocks.  This conclusion suggests that an empirical evaluation of the sticky
price model needs to consider the fact that our heterogenous belief economy with fully competitive
markets and flexible prices exhibits a behavior that may be confused with sticky price behavior.
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For the rest of this paper we use the volatility in the first column of Table 2 as a reference to
measuring the efficacy of any monetary policy.  Under a Friedman rule of constant money growth,
volatility can be reduced to a level specified in the second column.  If, in addition, all pure effects of
beliefs were neutralized by a central bank policy, fluctuations would be reduced to a level determined
by technology as in the third column of Table 2.  We thus put forward the following two questions:
(A) Is there a policy rule for which the economy attains the same level of volatility that would
be attained by a constant growth of money?
(B) Is there a policy rule for which the economy attains the level of volatility that would be
attained in an REE and be determined by technology only?
5. Economic Stabilization with a Monetary Rule
5.1 What is the Objective of Central Bank Policy?
What is the aim of a central bank when fluctuations are caused by the forces outlined in our
theory?  One may insist market allocation is optimal and no monetary action is needed.   Kurz, Jin and
Motolese (2003) argue (pages 222 -225) that market expectations act as an externality generating
excess fluctuations and hence the aim of monetary policy should be to reduce that component of
aggregate volatility generated by the beliefs of economic agents.  We briefly review this argument. 
A substantial part of volatility in an RBE is caused endogenously by the beliefs of agents. 
Hence, the level of market risk is greater than the level induced by exogenous shocks.  But if social risk
is caused by human conduct then society may elect to place limits on individual choice so as to reduce
the level of endogenous volatility.  The problem is that an RBE with complete hedging opportunities is
ex-ante Pareto optimal hence an effective policy makes some agents worse off.   It comes down to a
choice between ex-ante optimality and the excess volatility caused by diverse and inconsistent beliefs of
investors which often leads to poor collective investments and consumption decisions.  The ex-post
consequences of excess volatility in a market may thus be undesirable.
The problem of reconciling ex-ante and ex-post social outcomes is not new.  It was discussed by
Diamond (1967), Starr (1973), Mirrlees (1974), Hammond (1981), (1983), Nielsen (2000) (2003),
Silvestre (2001) and others.  The interest in an ex-post optimality is motivated by two considerations. 
First, researchers suggest that in an uncertain world agents may hold incorrect probability beliefs and
regret their decisions (e.g. Hammond (1981), page 236).  In a free society investors may use private
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capital for a project but when their beliefs are wrong, as they may be in an RBE,  their decisions may
have negative collective impact.  One can construct examples where the consequences of such actions
are jointly undesirable (see Kurz, Jin and Motolese (2003) page 224).  Under such circumstances social
preferences are sensitive to ex-post as well as ex-ante "expected" outcomes and society may benefit
from a coordination policy.  Second, diverse probability beliefs which are inconsistent across agents
raise the difficulty of even defining a "representative consumer" who holds a social expected utility. 
Hammond’s [1981],[1983] concept of Ex-Post Welfare Function proposes that society ignores the
probability beliefs of individual agents and instead uses society’s own probabilities over states.   
Applying these ideas to our context, Kurz, Jin and Motolese (2003) argue a central bank
recognizes that when agents hold diverse and inconsistent beliefs, some are wrong.  Since society has
the same information as the agents, the bank cannot determine whose beliefs are right.  Consequently,
the bank’s policy must take a symmetric view of the diversity of beliefs: over time any agent may hold a
correct belief and policy must be optimal with respect to a random draw of the agents over time.  The
rationality of belief conditions in an RBE imply the mean belief of any agent over time is exactly the
stationary measure.  Hence one symmetric perspective would propose that public policy be optimal
relative to the stationary measure of an RBE.  Here we study only the set of feasible policies.
In the next section we examine outcomes generated by a Taylor (1993) policy rules of the type 
(28) log
1 % rt
1 % r (
' vy log (
yt
y(
) % v
π
(πt & π
( )
where  are equal to the steady state values and  hence the economy has a positive( r ( , y( ) π( ' 0.01
long run inflation rate.  We then study in Section 5.3 a version of this rule with a random term, 
interpreted as a discretionary component of the policy,  not known to the market in advance.
5.2 Policy Rules without Discretion
In all policy experiments the real economy is exactly the same as in the reference economy.  To
examine the effect of rule (28) we turn off the money shocks  (i.e. set ) in the reference economy
kt ' 0
and replace it with (28).   Hence, to study the impact of policy one must focus only on the difference
between numbers reported in the tables below and the volatility in the reference economy for which
.σY ' 1.82 , σI ' 5.24 , σC ' 0.93 , σπ ' 2.91
30
Also, under  the central bank commits to a constant money growth hence we also compare
kt ' 0
volatility under rule (28) with a hypothetical economy with a constant growth of money.  
      Table 3: Efficacy of Alternative Monetary Rules: No Discretion
        (percent,   all data H-P filtered)
 vy  6 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0 5.0v
π
1.1
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.80
5.26
0.98
0.35
0.43
1.70
4.79
0.79
4.82
-0.57
1.61
4.51
0.62
9.94
-0.63
  1.54
  4.48
  0.51
15.00
-0.69
  1.48
  4.68
  0.47
20.02
 -0.76
   1.44
   5.08
   0.53
24.99
 -0.82
  1.43
  6.28
  0.83
34.79
-0.92
 1.48
 7.77
  1.21
44.44
-0.97
unstable unstable
1.2
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.80
5.26
0.98
0.26
0.42
1.74
4.97
0.87
2.66
-0.6
1.68
4.73
0.76
5.55
-0.63
1.63
4.57
0.67
8.41
-0.66
  1.59
  4.48
  0.59
11.24
-0.69
 1.55
 4.47
  0.52
14.05
-0.72
 1.49
 4.65
 0.47
19.59
-0.78
  1.44
  5.06
  0.52
25.04
-0.84
 1.43
 5.34
  0.58
27.74
-0.87
unstable
1.3
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.79
5.26
0.98
0.20
0.41
1.75
5.04
0.90
1.84
-0.64
1.71
4.85
0.82
3.86
-0.65
1.67
4.70
0.75
5.87
-0.67
1.64
4.59
0.68
7.85
-0.69
1.61
4.51
0.62
9.81
-0.71
 1.55
 4.47
  0.53
13.69
 -0.75
  1.50
  4.56
  0.47
17.52
-0.79
  1.49
  4.65
  0.47
19.41
-0.80
unstable
1.4
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.79
5.26
0.98
0.17
0.4
1.76
5.08
0.91
1.41
-0.68
1.73
4.92
0.85
2.97
-0.68
1.70
4.79
0.79
4.51
-0.69
1.67
4.67
0.73
6.04
-0.71
1.64
4.59
0.68
7.56
-0.72
  1.59
  4.48
  0.59
10.55
-0.75
  1.55
  4.47
  0.52
13.50
-0.77
 1.53
 4.49
 0.50
14.96
-0.79
unstable
1.5
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.79
5.26
0.98
0.14
0.39
1.76
5.10
0.92
1.15
-0.71
1.74
4.96
0.87
2.42
-0.71
1.71
4.84
0.81
3.67
-0.72
1.68
4.74
0.77
4.92
-0.73
1.66
4.65
0.72
6.16
-0.74
1.62
4.53
0.64
8.60
-0.76
  1.58
  4.47
  0.57
11.00
-0.78
  1.56
  4.46
  0.54
12.19
-0.79
unstable
10
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.80
5.27
0.98
0.02
0.32
1.79
5.24
0.97
0.07
-.099
1.79
5.21
0.96
0.15
-0.99
1.78
5.18
0.95
0.23
-0.99
1.77
5.15
0.94
0.30
-0.99
1.77
5.12
0.93
0.38
-0.99
1.76
5.06
0.90
0.53
-0.99
1.75
5.01
0.88
0.68
-0.99
1.74
4.98
0.87
0.75
-0.99
1.60
4.49
0.60
3.54
-0.99
4
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
Table 3 reports the variability of output, investment, consumption and inflation under the rule
(28).  It also reports the unconditional correlation between inflation and output.  It demonstrates that
monetary policy can have a major stabilization effect: there are many policies which lead to reduced real
volatility, relative to the reference economy, by a wide margin.  The table demonstrates the subtle
tradeoff between real volatility and inflation volatility which can be attained using different policy
instruments.  Some specific points to note are as follows:
(i)  Most efficient stabilization policies require joint policy instruments.  Efficient policy rules must
consider the joint instruments  and  in order to avoid increased volatility of both inflation andvy vπ
output.  Bold borders indicate policy rules which attain, for each , minimal consumption volatility. v
π
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(ii)  Apart from inflation, outcomes of policy instruments are not monotonic.  The effects of each
policy instrument  and  (holding the other fixed) on real variables are not monotonic.  However,vy vπ
the effects of both instruments on inflation volatility is monotonic: increasing    decreases inflationv
π
volatility while increasing   increases it.  vy
(iii)   is an efficient policy.  It attains a zero inflation volatility independently of .  v
π
'4 vy
(iv) Is there a rule attaining the outcome of a constant money growth for which 
σY'1.75,σI'5.02
?  The answer to this question (A) is yes!  A rule such as  attainsσC'0.89,σπ'1.60 (v
π
'1.3, vy'0.1)
results which are very close to those attained by a constant money growth policy. 
(v)  The strongest tradeoff is between consumption and inflation volatility.  Consumption volatility
may be reduced by as much as 52% relative to the reference economy.  
(vi)  There are rules that are socially preferred to a constant money growth rule. Consumption
stabilization requires either the cost of high inflation volatility or a very aggressive anti inflationary
policy.  Also, for some social preferences the policy  is superior to the reference(v
π
'1.5 , vy'0.5)
economy or to the constant money growth economy.  However, the stabilization outcome of this policy
is far from the observed U.S. record both with respect to inflation as well as real volatility. 
(vii)  A stabilization activist policy (i.e.  ) which is too aggressive can destabilize the economy.vy > 0
(viii)  There is no policy rule under (28) that attains the level determined by technology only, which is
. However there are policy rules that attain each of theσY ' 0.81 , σI ' 1.97 , σC ' 0.39 , σπ ' 0.73
consumption and inflation volatility goals, by itself.  The answer to question (B) in Section 4 is no, the
simple rule (28) cannot jointly stabilize to the level determined by technology only.
5.2a Activist monetary policy “destroys” the statistical Phillips Curve.  
Policy choices are expressed in our model with the two instruments .  It is thus not clear(v
π
, vy)
what are the policy choices that would be suggested by a Phillips Curve which is estimated from the
equilibrium data of an economy with given policy instruments.  In Table 3 we report unconditional
correlations between inflation and Log(GNP) and it is clear that as the policy becomes more activist
(i.e. vy > 0), this correlation tends to -1.  Focusing on conditional correlations, we report in Table 4
estimates of the same statistical Phillips Curve as in (27).  We study two specifications of the model:
one is OLS and the second (INST) uses instrumental variables where all exogenous and lagged
exogenous variables are used as instruments, given a policy instrument  v
π
 = 1.4 and for rising values of
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.  Each estimate is derived from an equilibrium with the specified  policy rule.  There are three clearvy
conclusions which emerge from Table 4:
     Table 4: Estimated Phillips Curves for Monetary Rules with v
π
 = 1.4; No Discretion
Model Variable vy ' 0 vy ' 0.1 vy ' 0.2 vy ' 0.3 vy ' 0.4 vy ' 0.5 vy ' 0.7 vy ' 0.9 vy ' 1.0 vy ' 5.0
OLS const.
Log(y)
πt&1
πt&2
 0.009
-0.015
 0.907
 0.044
-0.129
 0.258
 1.583
-0.396
-0.245
 0.504
 1.525
-0.351
-0.232
 0.485
 1.380
-0.300
-0.053
 0.116
 1.189
-0.244
-0.350
-0.720
 0.951
-0.181
  2.041
-4.260
  0.338
-0.035
   5.026
-10.531
  -0.378
   0.116
   6.894
-14.459
  -0.721
   0.181
 20.269
-42.819
   0.029
   0.037
INST const.
Log(y)
πt&1
πt&2
 0.009
-0.015
 0.907
 0.044
-0.110
 0.221
 1.528
-0.379
-0.279
 0.574
 1.573
-0.364
-0.321
 0.667
 1.462
-0.321
-0.174
 0.368
 1.273
-0.264
-0.220
-0.451
 1.022
-0.198
 2.005
-4.185
  0.351
-0.038
   5.230
-10.959
  -0.439
   0.128
   7.233
-15.172
  -0.811
   0.199
 20.265
-42.811 
   0.029
   0.037
(i) The statistical Phillips Curve is a relationship between two endogenous variables which is extremely
sensitive to the policy regime which prevails in that equilibrium.
(ii) For moderately activist policy rules with  the statistical Phillips Curve estimated for eachvy # 0.4
equilibrium is similar to the estimates which are obtained from U.S. data.
(iii) As policy becomes more activist the statistical Phillips Curve becomes essentially vertical.   Since
this statistical curve changes dramatically with the policy, there is no sense in which it reflects policy
choices along the curve; there are no policy instruments to accomplish such choices. 
Our results regarding the Phillips Curve raise doubts about a common practice in the policy
debate.  The practice is to estimate from data a Phillips Curve, treat it as a fixed structural equation
and perform policy experiments, assuming the economy moves along that fixed curve.  Our General
Equilibrium approach suggests this procedure is flawed and would lead to erroneous conclusions. 
  
5.3 Outcomes Under Policy Rules with Discretion
We now introduce a discretionary component to the monetary rule.  It is formulated as a
modified rule containing a random component  dt  so that the rule takes the form
(29a) log
1 % rt
1 % r (
' vy log (
yt
y(
) % v
π
(πt & π
( ) % dt
 with an empirical distribution 
(29b) .dt%1 ' λddt % ρ
d
t%1 where ρ
d
t%1-N( 0 , σd)
(29b) does not mean the central bank uses a randomized strategy.  Rather,  dt  is ex-ante unknown to
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the markets and reflects the public’s uncertainty about the future rule.  “Discretion” dt  also includes the
bank’s unknown reaction to unexpected shocks such as an oil shock, an international crisis etc.  Agents
know (29a)-(29b) but disagree at each  t  about the distribution of  dt+1 and this opens the door for
market’s beliefs about  dt+1 to impact the efficacy of the policy.  That is, when the policy contains a
discretionary “surprise,” diverse beliefs about future surprises are rationalizable.  We show that policy
outcomes are altered by such effects, offering risks and opportunities to bank’s policy.  
The introduction of dt  generates a new policy model but it is mathematically the same as the
model in (16) and (25).  Formally dt replaces kt , but with fundamentally different model implications. 
Without rewriting (16) and (25) note that the applicable parameters  are replaced by(λ
k
, σ
k
, λkg , λ
z
k
)
.  Consider first .  McCallum and Nelson (1999) study a rule with a random(λd , σd , λ
d
g , λ
z
d ) (λd ,σd )
term and estimate  but allow lagged variables and inertia in the rule.  We assume 
σd ' 0.0017 π
(
' 1%
per quarter hence we postulate  in order to study a discretion with standard deviation of  25 σd ' 0.0025
basis points.  Rudebusch (2002) argues policy inertia is inconsistent with lack of predictability of
changes in short rate and suggests that measured inertia arises from persistence in discretion.  This is
expressed by   and we study the hypothetical case of .   Variations in these parameters
λd > 0 λd ' 0.50
have small effects and do not alter our qualitative conclusions.  The parameters  describe(λdg , λ
z
d )
beliefs about discretion and before discussing the issues they raise, we first interpret them: 
 - effect of an agent belief state on his forecasted central bank discretionary decisions.λdg
 - the effect of a bank’s discretionary surprise on revision of agent’s forecasted market state of belief.λzd
It is obvious discretion introduces a random shock into the market and this, by itself, increases
volatility.  The main issue is how the added volatility interacts with market beliefs since the presence of a
random discretionary component triggers diverse beliefs, at any date t, about abnormal future rates. 
The range of values which  can feasibly take describes those rationalizable beliefs which may(λdg , λ
z
d )
exist in the market when a discretionary element is present in the policy rule.  
Now, the parameter  reflects how an agent’s belief about future high productivity and returnλdg
on investments translates into expectations about the bank’s discretionary decisions.  If   an agentλdg>0
who believes in abnormally high future productivity growth also believes the central bank is likely to
induce a positive discretionary increase of rates above the mean in (29a).   If   the opposite is true:λdg<0
an agent who is bullish about high future return on investments also believes the central bank is likely to
induce an abnormal discretionary decrease of rates to accommodate liquidity needs of a high investment
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economy.  It turns out that both cases are rationalizable with the RBE rationality principle, but within a
very narrow feasible range of .  In the policy experiments below we study the&0.0008< λdg <0.0008
impact of such market beliefs on the volatility of the economy.  We also discuss the desirability of
abandoning discretion altogether in favor of fully transparent policy rules.
What about the second parameter ?  Since dt is an unexpected shock, it turns out that theλ
z
d
parameter  has a small effect on volatility which is also not systematic.  Hence we ignore it by settingλzd
.  We thus study below two hypothetical economies with very modest parameter values ofλzd'0
Economy I  :     =   0.00   ,    λzd λ
d
g ' &0.0006
Economy II :     =  0.00   ,    .λzd λ
d
g ' 0.0006
Why could the discussed effects of market expectations be useful and what is the empirical
evidence in favor of Economy type I vs. type II?  To explain these issues we start with a simple general
principle which can be stated as follows:
Policy Principle: The efficacy of a monetary policy increases if public expectations are compatible and
supportive of the policy goals.  With such additional wind in the policy’s sails, the same policy
goals can be attained with less aggressive instruments relative to an economy in which market
expectations go against the policy and render it less effective.
To illustrate how this principle works consider a state when, due to their optimism, agents increase
planned consumption and investments conditional on the policy in place.  Agents can forecast the bank’s
normal interest rate using (29a) but what about the bank’s discretion?   If they expect bank’s discretion
to accommodate the liquidity needs of an expected abnormal burst of productivity and investments, they
would expect the bank to lower the nominal rate (i.e. ).  This means : when optimistic,dt%1 <0 λ
d
g<0
agents expect the central bank to accommodate the implied liquidity needs of an abnormally high growth
and high investment boom.  Now consider the opposite.  If agents expect bank’s discretion to resist
abnormal bursts of productivity and investments, they would expect the bank to raise the nominal rate
(i.e. ).   This means  : when optimistic, agents expect the central bank to resist the abnormaldt%1 >0 λ
d
g>0
growth and investments by raising rates.  
We observe that both patterns of behavior are rationalizable.  Also, any structure of rationalized
beliefs reflects social norms which are established over time under dynamics which is outside the scope
of our analysis.   However, we show below that for all policy instruments  Economy I with  is moreλdg<0
volatile than Economy II with .  In terms of the above policy principle, this means that when λdg>0 λ
d
g<0
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private expectations in Economy I operate against the policy goals resulting in reduced efficacy of policy
in Economy I relative to Economy II.  Similarly, in Economy II private expectations are aligned with the
policy goals hence they bolster and support them.  Since behavior under  bolsters policy, theλdg>0
central bank prefers private expectations to have the structure in Economy II.  However, the bank does
not choose the pattern of market beliefs; the bank’s only choice is whether to use discretion and this
choice should be influenced by the empirical evidence regarding the structure of private expectations. 
We discuss this choice later, after examining the simulation results.
5.3a Policy Rules with Discretion: Economy I
In Table 5 we report results of policy experiments for Economy I.  The results show that a
central bank’s decision whether to use discretion or employ full transparency in the policy rule has
effects on market volatility. There are three very clear conclusions which emerge from the table:
(i) For non activist policies with vy = 0 central bank’s discretion causes a dramatic rise in the
volatility of inflation due to the random discretionary element which is not present in Table 3.
This rise in volatility is not generated by the structure of market beliefs.
(ii) For all policy instruments the volatility of real variables is higher in Table 5 under central
bank’s discretion than in Table 3 without discretion.   This rise in volatility is not dramatic but
could add as much as 5% to the long term volatility of consumption.  It follows that the belief
structure in Economy I works against the policy goals: for any configuration of instruments,
central bank discretion increases the volatility of real variables.
(iii) The effect of bank’s discretion on volatility falls sharply as stabilization policy becomes more
aggressive.
We make two additional observations: 
(i) The pattern of non monotonic effects of policy instruments and the effect of policy instruments on the
estimated Phillips Curves are the same as in Table 3 and are not be repeated here.  
(ii) The very strong policy  results in exactly the same volatility in all three cases of Table 3, Tablev
π
' 4
5 and Table 6 showing that aggressive anti inflationary policy can neutralize all effects of discretion.  We
also note that under   the level of volatility is virtually the same as in the reference RBE economyv
π
' 4
except that the volatility of inflation is reduced to 0.  
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                   Table 5: Volatility Increasing Discretion
                (percent, all data H-P filtered)
 vy  6 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0 5.0v
π
1.1
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.83
5.44
1.04
2.13
0.19
 1.72
 4.91
 0.84
 4.36
-0.54
 1.63
 4.57
 0.67
 9.28
-0.61
  1.56
  4.46
  0.54
14.29
 -0.68
  1.50
  4.59
  0.47
19.29
 -0.74
  1.45
  4.94
  0.50
24.25
 -0.80
  1.42
  6.07
  0.77
34.05
 -0.90
  1.47
  7.53
  1.15
43.70
 -0.96
  1.52
  8.31
  1.35
48.48
 -0.98
unstable
1.2
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.83
5.44
1.04
1.78
0.18
1.77
5.11
0.92
2.49
-0.53
1.71
4.85
0.82
5.10
-0.61
1.66
4.65
0.72
7.88
-0.65
  1.61
  4.52
  0.63
10.68
-0.68
  1.57
  4.47
  0.56
13.47
-0.71
  1.50
  4.57
  0.47
19.00
-0.77
  1.45
  4.93
  0.50
24.46
-0.82
  1.44
  5.18
  0.55
27.15
-0.85
unstable
1.3
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.83
5.43
1.04
1.53
0.17
1.78
5.19
0.95
1.83
-0.53
1.74
4.98
0.87
3.55
-0.64
1.70
4.81
0.80
5.47
-0.66
1.67
4.67
0.73
7.41
-0.68
1.63
4.56
0.66
9.36
-0.70
  1.57
  4.47
  0.56
13.22
-0.74
  1.52
  4.51
  0.49
17.04
-0.77
  1.50
  4.58
  0.47
18.93
-0.79
unstable
1.4
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.83
5.43
1.03
1.34
0.16
1.79
5.23
0.97
1.49
-0.53
1.76
5.06
0.90
2.75
-0.66
1.72
4.90
0.84
4.21
-0.69
1.69
4.77
0.78
5.70
-0.7
1.66
4.66
0.73
7.19
-0.71
  1.61
  4.52
  0.63
10.17
-0.74
  1.57
  4.47
  0.55
13.11
-0.77
  1.55
  4.47
  0.52
14.57
-0.78
unstable
1.5
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.83
5.43
1.03
1.19
0.16
  1.79
  5.25
  0.97
  1.28
-0.52
  1.76
  5.10
  0.92
  2.26
-0.68
  1.74
  4.96
  0.87
  3.43
-0.71
  1.71
  4.84
  0.82
  4.64
-0.72
  1.68
  4.74
  0.77
  5.85
-0.73
  1.64
  4.58
  0.68
  8.28
-0.75
  1.60
  4.49
  0.60
10.68
-0.77
  1.58
  4.47
  0.57
11.87
-0.78
unstable
10
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.80
5.31
1.00
0.11
0.11
 1.80
 5.28
 0.98
 0.12
-0.52
 1.79
 5.25
 0.97
 0.18
-0.80
 1.79
 5.22
 0.96
 0.24
-0.90
 1.78
 5.19
 0.95
 0.31
-0.94
 1.77
 5.15
 0.94
 0.39
-0.96
 1.76
 5.10
 0.92
 0.53
-0.97
 1.75
 5.04
 0.90
 0.68
-0.98
 1.75
 5.02
 0.89
 0.75
-0.98
 1.60
 4.50
 0.61
 3.54
-0.99
4 
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
5.3b Policy Rules with Discretion: Economy II
Table 6 reports results of policy experiments with a specifications of Economy II.  Clearly, all
volatility measures in Table 6 are lower than in Table 5, hence the structure of beliefs in Economy II
works in support of the policy goals.  We conclude that if the central bank must use discretion, then the
belief structure of Economy II bolsters the policy while the belief structure in Economy I diminishes the
efficacy of policy.  Table 6 reveals results which are analogous to those reported for Table 5: (i) big rise
in inflation volatility for non activist policies with  vy = 0;  (ii) discretion, as such, increases volatility
while the belief structure ( ) reduces it, implying lower real volatility for most efficient policiesλdg>0
relative to the non discretionary case in Table 3; (iii) aggressive stabilization instruments can suppress
the negative impact of bank’s discretion.  Also, the non monotonic effect of policy instruments and the
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effect of policy instruments on the estimated Phillips Curves in Table 6 are the same as in Table 3. 
Table 6: Volatility Decreasing  Discretion
(percent, all data H-P filtered)
  vy  6 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0 5.0v
π
1.1
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.76
5.10
0.92
1.75
-0.00
1.67
4.68
0.74
5.80
-0.53
1.59
4.48
0.58
10.79
-0.62
1.52
4.51
0.48
15.80
-0.70
1.47
4.78
0.48
20.78
-0.77
1.44
5.23
0.56
25.73
-0.83
1.43
6.50
0.88
35.51
-0.93
1.50
8.01
1.27
45.14
-0.97
  1.56
  8.81
  1.47
49.90
-0.98
unstable
1.2
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.76
5.10
0.92
1.50
-0.01
1.71
4.83
0.81
3.55
-0.51
1.66
4.64
0.71
6.29
-0.60
1.61
4.51
0.62
9.09
-0.64
1.57
4.47
0.55
11.89
-0.69
1.53
4.49
0.50
14.67
-0.72
1.47
4.74
0.47
20.18
-0.79
1.44
5.21
0.56
25.61
-0.85
1.43
5.50
0.62
28.30
-0.87
unstable
1.3
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.76
5.10
0.92
1.31
-0.015
1.72
4.90
0.84
2.64
-0.5
1.68
4.74
0.77
4.51
-0.60
1.65
4.62
0.70
6.45
-0.64
1.62
4.53
0.64
8.40
-0.68
1.59
4.48
0.58
10.34
-0.70
1.53
4.49
0.50
14.19
-0.75
1.49
4.63
0.47
17.99
-0.79
1.47
4.74
0.47
19.87
-0.81
unstable
1.4
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.76
5.10
0.92
1.16
-0.02
1.73
4.94
0.86
2.13
-0.5
1.70
4.80
0.80
3.54
-0.61
1.67
4.68
0.74
5.02
-0.66
1.64
4.60
0.69
6.52
-0.68
1.62
4.53
0.64
8.01
-0.71
1.57
4.47
0.56
10.98
-0.74
1.53
4.49
0.50
13.91
-0.78
1.51
4.53
0.48
15.36
-0.79
unstable
1.5
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.77
5.10
0.92
1.04
-0.02
1.74
4.96
0.86
1.79
-0.51
1.71
4.84
0.81
2.92
-0.62
1.68
4.73
0.76
4.12
-0.67
1.66
4.65
0.72
5.33
-0.7
1.64
4.58
0.68
6.55
-0.72
1.59
4.49
0.60
8.96
-0.75
1.56
4.46
0.54
11.35
-0.78
1.54
4.47
0.51
12.53
-0.79
unstable
10
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.79
5.23
0.97
0.11
0.06
1.78
5.20
0.95
0.13
-0.55
1.78
5.17
0.94
0.18
-0.81
1.77
5.14
0.93
0.25
-0.89
1.77
5.10
0.92
0.32
-0.93
1.76
5.08
0.91
0.39
-0.95
1.75
5.02
0.89
0.54
-0.97
1.74
4.97
0.87
0.69
-0.97
1.73
4.95
0.86
0.76
-0.98
1.59
4.48
0.59
3.54
-0.99
4 
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.01
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.01
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.01
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
The beliefs patterns in Economies I and II are both rationalizable, but which of the two better
reflects the empirical record?  We do not have conclusive evidence but the recent experience of the
period 1996 - 2001 provides a hint.  During that time, the economy experienced very high growth rate
above normal and most private sector observers demanded and predicted the central bank will follow a
low discretionary interest rate policy, accommodating the liquidity needs of an abnormally high growth
economy.  This implies an expectations parameter  of Economy I, proposing it to be the normλdg<0
hence the qualitative results of Table 5 may be more likely to be the correct ones relative to Table 6.
We add that during the 1996-2003 episode the Fed actually executed a discretionary component
of low interest policy which contributed to the intense investment boom of 1996-1999.  Claiming to
detect a structural break into a regime of high and persistent productivity growth, the Fed maintained
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low interest rates up to very late in June of 1999 when it began to raise rates.  Late in 2000 it became
evident the over-heated investment boom was weakening and in January 2001 the Fed drastically
reversed course starting a historical reduction of the fund’s rate during 2001.  Evidence in support of the
Fed’s claim of a structural break into high productivity regime is limited.  Our theory proposes that had
the Fed followed a non discretionary policy it would have raised rates earlier, slowing early the
economy’s excess.  The resulting level of real and financial volatility in 1996-2003 would have been
lower.  The Fed’s discretionary “judgment” contributed to the actual volatility during this time.
Should discretion be practices by a central bank?  There are unique circumstances like a war, an
imminent collapse of a major financial institution when discretion has obvious social benefits not in our
model.  However, recognizing that discretion is costly, our theory leads to several conclusions: 
(i) If a bank follows a mild, non activist anti inflation policy such as ( v
π
 # 1.5,  vy = 0) then the
effects of discretion on inflation volatility are large and in this case a central bank should
abandon discretion altogether.
(ii) If a bank follows a strong stabilization policy such as (v
π
 > 1.5, vy > 0.3) then the effects of
discretion are small and in practice may be disregarded.  Discretion has very low cost.
(iii) In most intermediate cases discretion has significant cost which depend upon the structure of
market expectations.  Discretion may be a desirable feature of the policy rule if the belief
structure of agents is in accord with Economy II.  The limited evidence does not support this
case and suggests that in that case discretion should be avoided.
Notwithstanding the above, we note that a central bank does not have better information or superior
ability to make economic judgments than the private sector.  Hence, the real social gain from discretion
can arise only in those unequivocal catastrophic circumstances when there is no objection to a central
bank’s discretion.  As a result, the weight of the argument supports the conclusion that central bank
policy should be transparent and should abandon discretion except for most unusual circumstances.
5.4 On Inertia and Inflation Volatility
All policy rules studied up to now implied extremely high equilibrium volatility of inflation. 
While recorded inflation volatility is around 2% our models predict much higher, counterfactual, levels
of inflation volatility induced by any activist policy rule.  This problem is resolved by the introduction of
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inertia into the policy rule.  We thus consider the rule 
(30) .log
1% rt
1% r (
' vy log(
yt
y(
) % v
π
(πt & π
( ) % α[log
1% rt&1
1% r (
]
The available econometric estimates for  "  are around  0.8 and this is the value we us.  We have then
computed the RBE under the general policy rule (30) with inertia but without discretion. 
      Table 7: Monetary Rules with Inertia: α = 0.80, No  Discretion
        (percent,   all data H-P filtered)
   vy  6 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0 5.0v
π
1.1
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
 1.79
 5.26
 0.98
 0.08
-0.44
 1.76
 5.07
 0.91
 0.71
-0.49
 1.72
 4.91
 0.84
 1.47
-0.46
 1.69
 4.77
 0.78
 2.23
-0.47
 1.66
 4.67
 0.73
 3.00
-0.47
  1.64
  4.59
  0.68
  3.77
-0.49
 1.59
 4.49
 0.60
 5.33
-0.51
 1.56
 4.46
 0.53
 6.91
-0.54
 1.54
 4.47
 0.51
 7.70
-0.55
unstable
1.2
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.79
5.26
0.98
0.08
-0.44
1.76
5.08
0.91
0.62
-0.55
1.73
4.93
0.85
1.28
-0.52
1.70
4.80
0.80
1.94
-0.52
1.67
4.70
0.75
2.61
-0.52
1.65
4.62
0.70
3.28
-0.53
1.61
4.51
0.62
4.64
-0.55
1.57
4.47
0.56
6.01
-0.57
1.56
4.46
0.53
6.70
-0.58
unstable
1.3
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.79
5.26
0.98
0.07
-0.45
1.76
5.09
0.92
0.55
-0.6
1.73
4.95
0.86
1.13
-0.57
1.71
4.83
0.81
1.72
-0.56
1.68
4.73
0.76
2.31
-0.56
1.66
4.65
0.72
2.91
-0.57
1.62
4.53
0.64
4.10
-0.58
1.58
4.48
0.58
5.31
-0.6
1.57
4.47
0.55
5.91
-0.61
unstable
1.4
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.79
5.26
0.98
0.07
-0.45
1.77
5.10
0.92
0.49
-0.65
1.74
4.97
0.87
1.02
-0.61
1.71
4.86
0.82
1.54
-0.6
1.69
4.76
0.78
2.07
-0.6
1.67
4.68
0.73
2.61
-0.61
1.63
4.55
0.66
3.68
-0.62
1.59
4.49
0.60
4.75
-0.63
1.58
4.47
0.57
5.30
-0.64
unstable
1.5
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.80
5.26
0.98
0.06
-0.45
1.77
5.11
0.92
0.45
-0.69
1.74
4.99
0.88
0.93
-0.65
1.72
4.88
0.83
1.40
-0.64
1.69
4.78
0.79
1.88
-0.64
1.67
4.70
0.75
2.36
-0.64
1.64
4.58
0.68
3.33
-0.65
1.60
4.51
0.62
4.31
-0.66
1.59
4.48
0.59
4.80
-0.67
unstable
10
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
 1.80
 5.27
 0.98
 0.01
-0.47
 1.79
 5.24
 0.97
 0.07
-0.99
 1.79
 5.21
 0.96
 0.14
-0.99
 1.78
 5.17
 0.95
 0.20
-0.99
 1.77
 5.15
 0.94
 0.27
-0.99
 1.77
 5.11
 0.93
 0.33
-0.99
 1.76
 5.06
 0.90
 0.46
-0.99
 1.75
 5.01
 0.88
 0.59
-0.99
 1.74
 4.98
 0.87
 0.66
-0.99
 1.64
 4.58
 0.68
 3.33
-0.65
4
Y
I
Cπρ(π,Y)
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.01
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.93
0.00
na
1.80
5.28
0.98
0.00
na
In Table 7 we report simulation results for the same policy instruments  and   as in Table 3. v
π
vy
It is clear from the table that with inertia the volatility level of inflation is drastically reduced and for
most efficient policy rules it is less than 2.5% per quarter, which is compatible with the empirical record. 
But Table 7, compared with Table 3, reveals some additional and very interesting results.
(i)  Feasible stabilization of real variables is reduced under inertia.   For activist rules with  thevy # 1
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lowest consumption volatility is around 0.51% compared to 0.47% without inertia.  For output this
minimal volatility is 1.43% without inertia and 1.54% with inertia. Under the drastic rule  allv
π
' 4
volatility measures are the same with or without inertia.
(ii)  The rule  and  attains more real stability than the constant money rule.  Withv
π
'1.5 vy'0.5
inertia, ( , ) implies a lower real volatility than volatility under constant money growth butv
π
'1.5 vy'0.5
with higher inflation volatility.  With , we have ,   ,(v
π
'1.5 vy'0.5) σY'1.67,σI'4.70 σC'0.75
 while with Friedman’s rule , . σ
π
'2.36 σY'1.75 , σI'5.02 , σC'0.89 σπ'1.60
(iii) Policy rules with inertia generate negative unconditional correlation between inflation and output. 
In addition, for activist policy rules in Table 7 our analysis shows that statistical Phillips Curves are not
present in the data.  For activist policies with   they are essentially vertical.vy > 0.3
5.5     How Activist is the Current U.S. Policy?  
To answer this question we review two key results which bear on the question at hand.
(i) The reference economy with money shocks replicates well the empirical record, including a statistical
Phillips Curve which matches those estimated with U.S. data. 
(ii) All economies under a monetary rule can replicate the real empirical record.  However, such
economies generate data with negative correlation between output and inflation and in which the
statistical Phillips Curves are inverted for all activist policy rules with vy $ 0.4.  But then all activist
monetary rules offer more real stabilization than observed in the real data.   
Since real data exhibit a statistical Phillips Curve, the policy rules which are compatible with this
fact require  vy # 0.4.  But this seems to contradict the econometric estimates which propose that the
policy rule used in the U.S. is around  v
B
 = 1.5 and vy = 0.5  with an inertia parameter around 0.8.  To
explore this issue note that such a policy rule, with or without inertia, implies real stabilization which is
much stronger (i.e. ) than the volatility of the reference economy or the
σY'1.67 , σI'4.70 , σC'0.75
volatility observed in the U.S. data.  In addition, such a rule requires the data to exhibit negative
correlation between inflation and output.  In all models we examined here (v
B
 = 1.5 , vy = 0.5)  is not
compatible with the estimated statistical Phillips Curves, implying incorrect slopes.  The only conclusion
which is not contradicted by the data is that the policy perceived by the markets is less activist.  For
example, to generate an inflation volatility of about 2% the policy v
B
 = 1.3 and vy = 0.1 without
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discretion or inertia generate data which approximate the empirical record, including statistical Phillips
Curve.  With discretion the policy  v
B
 = 1.3 and vy = 0.1 also approximates the empirical record.  With
inertia the policy  v
B
 = 1.3 and vy = 0.3 is a reasonable approximation.  Since the Fed has not committed
to any particular policy rule, the empirical record may also be affected by other factors such as the
uncertainty perceived by agents about the rule itself.  These issues are not explored here.
6. Concluding Comments
The literature on policy rules is so extensive that it is difficult to compare our results with others. 
The effects of any policy rule depends upon the structural theory explaining why the policy has real
effects.  Our model is traditional: it assumes perfect competition, flexible prices and symmetric
information.  The novelty of our theory is that it offers a unified paradigm of economic fluctuations in
which heterogeneity of beliefs is the key propagation mechanism.  We show most volatility (real and
financial) is driven by demand where fluctuations in demand are induced by market states of belief.  We
show that market beliefs amplify exogenous shocks and propagate business cycles; they generates money
non-neutrality; they are responsible for the efficacy of monetary policy and provide the reason why
monetary policy should aim at economic stabilization.  Our main results are as follows:
$ Assuming small technological shocks, our RBE economy replicates well the empirical business
cycle record in the U.S.  This includes the estimated Phillips Curve from the simulated data of an
economy with exogenous money injection shocks.
$ Relative to a hypothetical economy in which money supply grows at a random rate, the level of
fluctuations would decline by about 4% - 5% if money grew at a constant rate.
$ Although prices are fully flexible, money shocks result in less than a proportional changes in
inflation hence the aggregate price level appears “sticky” with respect to money shocks.
$ A monetary rule without discretion and without inertia offers strong stabilization choices
between inflation and real volatility.  Aggressive anti-inflationary rule can reduce inflation
volatility to zero.  Significant real stabilization is attainable by either accepting high inflation
volatility or by an aggressive inflation stabilization, jointly employed with output stabilization.
$ Activist monetary rules generate market data which exhibit no statistical Phillips Curve.
$ Discretion in monetary policy has significant impact on volatility.  For the two extremes cases we
show that if a non activist policy is followed, the effects of discretion on inflation volatility are
large and if an aggressive stabilization policy is followed the effects of discretion are small.
• In intermediate cases the effect of discretion depends upon the structure of market beliefs.
• Since real social gain from discretion arise only in extraordinary cases when the gain is obvious, 
the weight of the argument leads to the conclusion that bank’s policy should be transparent and
abandon discretion except for most unusual circumstances.
$ The main effect of inertia is to reduce dramatically inflation volatility to the observed levels.
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Appendix A: Construction of the Random Variables  ρ jt%1(u
j
t )
The  variables   are our tools to enable agents to exhibit subjective beliefs with "fat"ρjt%1(u
j
t )
tails reflecting over confidence.  We define  by specifying its density, conditional on :ρjt%1(u
j
t ) u
j
t
(A1) P(ρjt%1 |u
j ) '
φ1( u
j )Φ(ρjt%1 ) if ρ
j
t%1 $ 0
φ2( u)Φ(ρ
j
t%1 ) if ρ
j
t%1 < 0
where   and   (in (19))  are independent and whereρjt%1 ρ˜
g j
t%1
(A2)   .Φ(s) ' 1
2π
e
&
s 2
2
To show the agent can hold such a belief and be rational, we use the Conditional Stability Theorem
(see Kurz Schneider (1996)).  A sufficient condition which it suggests requires that if  G(uj)  is the
empirical density of  uj  then we need to ensure that
           .
m
4
&4
P(ρj |u j ) G(u j )du j ' Φ(ρj) , a Normal density of ρj
From (A1) it follows that this condition is implied by
          and     .
m
4
&4
φ1(u
j ) G(u j )du j ' 1
m
4
&4
φ2(u
j ) G(u j )du j ' 1
To explain, since the empirical distribution of  uj  is normal, average over   generates a randomu j
variable   such that . Averaged components of   (i.e. ) areρ¯ jt%1 ρ¯
j
t%1-N(0 , 1 ) Ψt%1(u
j
t ) λ
υ
(·)ρ¯ jt%1% ρ˜
υ
t%1
then normally distributed with mean 0 and variance determined by the rationality conditions.
As for interpreting , the functions  allow agents to be  optimistic or pessimisticρjt%1(u
j
t ) φi(u
j)
about   being positive or negative.  are monotone: is rising with  yj  and ρjt%1 φj(u
j ) φ1(u
j ) φ2(u
j )
declining with  uj.  When they converge rapidly to their asymptotic values the densities take the form
(i)  For large positive  uj  (or gj) the mean value of the density becomes positive since
(A3a) P(ρjt%1 |u
j large ) '
φ1(4 )Φ(ρ
j
t%1 ) for ρ
j
t%1 $ 0
φ2(4 )Φ(ρ
j
t%1 ) for ρ
j
t%1 < 0
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(ii)  For large negative  uj  (or gj)  the mean value of the density becomes positive since
(A3b)    P(ρjt%1 |u
j small ) '
n1(&4 )Φ(ρ
j
t%1 ) for ρ
j
t%1 $ 0
φ2(&4 )Φ(ρ
j
t%1 ) for ρ
j
t%1 < 0 .
As a practical approximation we have selected the function 
(A3c)   ,      ,      .ψ(u j) ' 1
1 % e bu
j(g j)
B '
m
4
&4
ψ(u j)Gˆ(u j)du j φ1(u) '
ψ(u)
B
Direct calculations reveal the three empirical moments of the random variable  ρj  under discussion
.E[ρj ] ' 0 , E[ (ρj)2 ] ' 1 , E [ρju j ] '
2
2π
E [ψ (u j ) u j]
B
The parameter  b  is the over confidence parameter as it specifies the degree of fat tails in the
conditional distribution of .   In the discussion of the symmetric case below we shall use theρjt%1(u
j
t )
notation  and   .σ2u ' Var(u) r
ρu ' E[
ρt%1(u)u
σu
]
Appendix B: Statement of the Rationality Conditions
The rationality of belief principle requires that 
(B1)    has the same joint empirical distribution as .Ψt%1(u
j
t ) '
λ
υ
gρ
j
t%1 (u
j
t ) % ρ˜
υ
j
t%1
λ
k
gρ
j
t%1 (u
j
t ) % ρ˜
k
j
t%1
λ
z 1
g ρ
j
t%1 ( u
j
t ) % ρ˜
z j1
t%1
λ
z 2
g ρ
j
t%1 ( u
j
t ) % ρ˜
z j2
t%1
ρt%1 '
ρ
υ
t%1
ρ
k
t%1
ρ
z 1
t%1
ρ
z 2
t%1
To clarify the mathematical development below keep in mind the consistency conditions between gj
and zj.  These conditions require that the realizations of the two are the same and hence they have the
same marginal empirical distribution.  This fact is not known to the agent and hence this equality does
not hold in the agent’s perception model.  More generally, in the agent’s perception model there is
nothing to require that the covariance between gj and any state variable be the same as the covariance
implied by the system (16) between  zj and that variable.   Indeed, the presence of  in allρjt%1(u
j
t )
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equations of the perception model (25) generates covariance between gj and other state variables
which is perceived by agent j but is not present in (16).  The idea is that any covariance between an
agent’s own state of belief and other variables in the economy are strictly in the mind of the agent and
no rationality conditions are imposed on them.  An important way to understand this is to note that
under the condition of anonymity an agent sees no relationship between his own state of belief and the
market vector of belief.  Below we give a precise mathematical definition of anonymity. 
We show first that (B1)  fully specify the covariance matrix   of the four dimensional vector Ωj
ρρ
in the  perception models (25)-(26).  To see this rewrite (21a) in the formρ˜jt%1
(B2) .x jt%1 ' Axt % λg jρ
j
t%1(u
j
t ) % ρ˜
j
t%1
Now define  and denote by  V  be the covariance matrix of the random vector  σ2
ρ
' E[(ρjt%1( u
j
t ) )
2] xt
according to the empirical distribution (18).   Computing the covariance matrix in (B2) and equating
the computed value to  V  leads to the equality   which means thatV ' AVAN % λg j(λg j)Nσ
2
ρ
% Ω
j
ρρ
(B3) .Ωj
ρρ
' V & AVAN & λg j(λg j)Nσ
2
ρ
Given vector of parameters (b, )  all magnitudes on the right of (B3) are known and this pins downλg j
the covariance matrix  .  In the symmetric case used in this paper the parameters are the same forΩj
ρρ
both agents hence in the computations we have
(B3') .Ω
ρρ
' V & AVAN & λg(λg)Nσ
2
ρ
Since a perception model includes (19), it follows that in the model of the agent we need to
specify the full joint distribution of five variables: the four basic observables  xt  together with the agent
state of belief  .  Hence the agent’s perception model is specified by a 5×5 covariance matrix  S  ofg jt
the innovations.  Focusing on the symmetric case we write the matrix  S in the block form
Ω '
Ω
ρρ
, Ωxg
Ω
N
xg , σ
2
g
where =   is a 4×1 covariance
Ωxg [Cov( ρ˜
υ
t%1 , ρ˜
g j
t%1 ) , Cov( ρ˜
k
t%1 , ρ˜
g j
t%1 ) , Cov( ρ˜
z 1
t%1 , ρ˜
g j
t%1 ) , Cov( ρ˜
z 2
t%1 , ρ˜
g j
t%1 )]
vector of the innovations of the agent’s belief and the innovations of the observables in the agent’s
perception model (see 25).  Now define the following  
 is the unconditional covariance between gj and the four observables  x;rj / Cov(x , g
j )
 the vector of   x  parameters in the gj  equation (19);aj ' (λ
z j
υ
, λz
j
k
, 0 , 0 )
A simple direct computation reveals that we have at hand two systems of 4 equations each:
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(B4.1) rj ' λz jArj % AVaj % λz jλg jrρuσu %Ωxg
(B4.2) Ωxg ' rj & λz jArj & AVaj % λz jλg jrρuσu
where .  We need conditions which will pin down .  Note that this matrix wouldr
ρu ' E[
ρt%1(u)u
σu
] Ωxg
be fully specified if we specify the 4×1 vector   since we can use this information torj / Cov(x , g
j )
compute  in (B4.2).   We proceed here in two steps.  First we utilize the definition of anonymity to
Ωxg
specify the last two components of , which are .  We thus introduce Ωxg Cov(ρ˜
z 1
t%1 , ρ˜
g j
t%1 ) ,Cov( ρ˜
z 2
t%1 , ρ˜
g j
t%1)
Definition: A belief is said to satisfy the condition of anonymity if
 .
Ωz 1g j
Ωz 2g j
'
Cov( ρ˜z
1
t%1 , ρ˜
g j
t%1 )
Cov( ρ˜z
2
t%1 , ρ˜
g j
t%1 )
'
0
0
It is then clear that anonymity pins down the last two elements of .  We need two more restrictionΩxg
on (4B.1)-(4B.2) to pin down the first two elements.   With this objective in mind we show that these
two restrictions are deduced from the final rationality condition of no serial correlation of . Ψt%1(u
j
t )
For  to exhibit no serial correlation it is sufficient that it is uncorrelated with date tΨt%1(u
j
t )
public information.   To see why this is true recall that    henceΨt%1(u
j
t ) ' xt%1 & Axt
  .E[Ψt%1(u
j
t ) Ψt( u
j
t&1 )] ' E[Ψt%1( u
j
t )(xt & Axt&1)] ' E[Ψt%1( u
j
t )(xt)] & E[Ψt%1(u
j
t )Axt&1] ' 0
But now, to ensure that these conclusions hold we need to put restrictions on   to imply that  arerj u
j
t
not correlated with any  for all i.   To that end note that by definitionx jt&i
.u(g jt%1 ) ' g
j
t%1 & r
N
j V
&1xt%1
Hence, direct computations reveal that
.u(g jt%1 ) ' g
j
t%1 & r
N
j V
&1xt%1 ' λz jg
j
t % ajNxt % ρ˜
g j
t%1 & rjNV
&1(Axt % λg jρ
j
t%1 (ut) % ρ˜
j
t%1 )
Hence, the condition    requires Cov(u jt%1 , xt ) / E[ u
j
t%1 xtN] ' 0
(B5)      . λz j rjN % ajNV & rjNV
&1 AV ' 0
Although equation (B5) is a system of 4 equations, we now show that (B5) are the last two restrictions
implied by the rationality of belief conditions.  To see this fact note that since V is an invertible matrix,
equation (B5) can be solved for the covariance vector ,  implying the following restrictionsrj
(B6) .[AN & λz j I ] V
&1 rjN ' aj
We study here only the symmetric case .   In this case we have that the matrix A takes the
λz 1 ' λz 2 ' λz
following form
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      AN '
λ
υ
, 0 , λ
z1
υ
, λ
z2
υ
0 , λ
k
, λ
z1
k
, λ
z2
k
0 , 0 , λz , 0
0 , 0 , 0 , λz
hence   is singular with the last two rows being zero.  This is compatible with the fact that[AN & λz j I ]
  hence, (B5) consists of only two restrictions.    Now (B5) together with theaj ' (λ
z j
υ
, λz
j
k
, 0 , 0 )
earlier conditions   determines  rj.   When rj  is known,  is pinned down as follows. Ωz 1g j 'Ωz 2g j ' 0 σ˜
2
g j
Since we know that  ,  we use the condition  to compute σ2
u j
' var( g j ) & rjNV
&1rj var(g
j ) ' var( z j )
.σ˜2
g j
' ( 1 & λ2
z j
) var(g j ) & ajNVaj & 2λz j ajNrj
6-
uj > 0 uj < 0
Figure 1: Non-Normal Belief Densities.
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